CVE-2026-31773: Linux kernel · Improper Authentication
Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.8 High · fixed in b1c6a8e554a39b222c0879a288ea98e338fc4d77 : patch Linux kernel soon.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 13:47 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 20% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- CISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
- Automatable
- Attackers cannot reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
- Technical impact
- Total control over the software or total information disclosure
CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-10-16.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in b1c6a8e554a39b222c0879a288ea98e338fc4d77, 20756fec2f0108cb88e815941f1ffff88dc286fe, 929db734d12db41ca5f95424db4612397f1bd4a7 +6
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 1 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state The legacy responder path in smp_random() currently labels the stored STK as authenticated whenever pending_sec_level is BT_SECURITY_HIGH. That reflects what the local service requested, not what the pairing flow actually achieved. For Just Works/Confirm legacy pairing, SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH stays clear and the resulting STK should remain unauthenticated even if the local side requested HIGH security. Use the established MITM state when storing the responder STK so the key metadata matches the pairing result. This also keeps the legacy path aligned with the Secure Connections code, which already treats JUST_WORKS/JUST_CFM as unauthenticated.
References
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a38659a3d06080715691bd3139f9c4b61f688e3 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/667f44f1392df6482483756458c48670e579e9ff (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/929db734d12db41ca5f95424db4612397f1bd4a7 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1c6a8e554a39b222c0879a288ea98e338fc4d77 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/0afc846bd80073ffcd2b8040f2b2fafaea3d9f72 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/061ee71ac6b03c9f8432fe49538c3682bfcf4cf3 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a6d0db176f082685e0b6149700c0baf3ce2aa8b (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/20756fec2f0108cb88e815941f1ffff88dc286fe (opens in a new tab)