CVE-2026-34369: WWBN AVideo · Missing Authorization
Affects WWBN AVideoSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 33% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 27 Mar 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| WWBNAVideo | Affected
| Fixed in– |
GitHubwwbn/AVideopkg:github/wwbn/AVideoOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
A fix is available and has been implemented in the codebase as commit be344206f2f461c034ad2f1c5d8212dd8a52b8c7. Users should upgrade to a version that includes this fix or apply the patch from this commit to ensure that API endpoints properly enforce password verification. Since this is not a cloud service, remediation depends on applying the patch or upgrading the affected software.
Description
WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `get_api_video_file` and `get_api_video` API endpoints in AVideo return full video playback sources (direct MP4 URLs, HLS manifests) for password-protected videos without verifying the video password. While the normal web playback flow enforces password checks via the `CustomizeUser::getModeYouTube()` hook, this enforcement is completely absent from the API code path. An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve direct playback URLs for any password-protected video by calling the API directly. Commit be344206f2f461c034ad2f1c5d8212dd8a52b8c7 fixes the issue.