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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-34610: smuellerDD leancrypto · Incorrect Conversion Between Numeric Types

Affects smuellerDD leancryptoSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.9 Medium : upgrade to 1.7.1 when convenient.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.9Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 5% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.7.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 2 Apr 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade leancrypto and smuellerdd/leancrypto to 1.7.1.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
smuellerDDleancryptoAffected
  • <1.7.1
Fixed in
  • 1.7.1
GitHubsmuellerdd/leancryptopkg:github/smuellerdd/leancryptoOther threatsAffected
  • <1.7.1
Fixed in
  • 1.7.1

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Upgrade leancrypto to version 1.7.1 or later, where the vulnerability has been patched. No other mitigations are indicated or necessary as the fix addresses the root cause of the numeric truncation.

Description

The leancrypto library is a cryptographic library that exclusively contains only PQC-resistant cryptographic algorithms. Prior to version 1.7.1, lc_x509_extract_name_segment() casts size_t vlen to uint8_t when storing the Common Name (CN) length. An attacker who crafts a certificate with CN = victim's CN + 256 bytes padding gets cn_size = (uint8_t)(256 + N) = N, where N is the victim's CN length. The first N bytes of the attacker's CN are the victim's identity. After parsing, the attacker's certificate has an identical CN to the victim's — enabling identity impersonation in PKCS#7 verification, certificate chain matching, and code signing. This issue has been patched in version 1.7.1.

References

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