CVE-2026-34610: smuellerDD leancrypto · Incorrect Conversion Between Numeric Types
Affects smuellerDD leancryptoSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.9 Medium : upgrade to 1.7.1 when convenient.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 5% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.7.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 2 Apr 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade leancrypto and smuellerdd/leancrypto to 1.7.1.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| smuellerDDleancrypto | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubsmuellerdd/leancryptopkg:github/smuellerdd/leancryptoOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Upgrade leancrypto to version 1.7.1 or later, where the vulnerability has been patched. No other mitigations are indicated or necessary as the fix addresses the root cause of the numeric truncation.
Description
The leancrypto library is a cryptographic library that exclusively contains only PQC-resistant cryptographic algorithms. Prior to version 1.7.1, lc_x509_extract_name_segment() casts size_t vlen to uint8_t when storing the Common Name (CN) length. An attacker who crafts a certificate with CN = victim's CN + 256 bytes padding gets cn_size = (uint8_t)(256 + N) = N, where N is the victim's CN length. The first N bytes of the attacker's CN are the victim's identity. After parsing, the attacker's certificate has an identical CN to the victim's — enabling identity impersonation in PKCS#7 verification, certificate chain matching, and code signing. This issue has been patched in version 1.7.1.