CVE-2026-35209: unjs defu · Prototype Pollution
Affects unjs defuSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 6.1.5 soon.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 34% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 6.1.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 6 Apr 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade unjs defu to 6.1.5.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| unjsdefu | Affected
| Fixed in
|
npmdefupkg:npm/defuOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Upgrade to defu version 6.1.5 or later, which replaces the vulnerable Object.assign usage with object spread syntax to prevent prototype pollution.
Description
defu is software that allows uers to assign default properties recursively. Prior to version 6.1.5, applications that pass unsanitized user input (e.g.parsed JSON request bodies, database records, or config files from untrusted sources) as the first argument to `defu()` are vulnerable to prototype pollution. A crafted payload containing a `__proto__` key can override intended default values in the merged resul. The internal `_defu` function used `Object.assign({}, defaults)` to copy the defaults object. `Object.assign` invokes the `__proto__` setter, which replaces the resulting object's `[[Prototype]]` with attacker-controlled values. Properties inherited from the polluted prototype then bypass the existing `__proto__` key guard in the `for...in` loop and land in the final result. Version 6.1.5 replaces `Object.assign({}, defaults)` with object spread (`{ ...defaults }`), which uses `[[DefineOwnProperty]]` and does not invoke the `__proto__` setter.