CVE-2026-42027: Apache OpenNLP · Unsafe Reflection
Affects Apache OpenNLPSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.8 Critical · fixed in 3.0.0-M3 : patch Apache OpenNLP as a priority.
Data as of 1 Nov 2026, 22:58 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 53% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 3.0.0-M3, 2.5.9, 1.9.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 4 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 1 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade Apache OpenNLP and Apache Software Foundation/org.apache.opennlp:opennlp-tools to 3.0.0-M3, 2.5.9 or 1.9.5; org.apache.opennlp/opennlp to 2.5.9.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Software FoundationApache OpenNLP | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Apache Software FoundationApache OpenNLP | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Apache Software FoundationApache OpenNLP | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Mavenorg.apache.opennlp/opennlppkg:maven/org.apache.opennlp/opennlpOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
MavenApache Software Foundation/org.apache.opennlp:opennlp-toolspkg:maven/Apache Software Foundation/org.apache.opennlp:opennlp-toolsOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
A fix is available in Apache OpenNLP versions 2.5.9 and 3.0.0-M3, which implement a package-prefix allowlist to prevent execution of static initializers for disallowed classes. Users should upgrade to these fixed versions. For users who cannot upgrade immediately, it is recommended to only load model files from trusted sources and audit the classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, especially those performing JNDI lookups, network I/O, or filesystem access. Deployments that require loading classes outside the opennlp.* package must explicitly register allowed packages via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) or the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property before model loading.
Description
Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader Versions Affected: before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3 Description: The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class. Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load. Mitigation: * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization.
References
- lists.apache.org/thread/ltlo4powjfc0w2w2yyl1o5tc7q1gcb2y (opens in a new tab)
- openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/01/20 (opens in a new tab)
- access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-42027 (opens in a new tab)
- bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2466527 (opens in a new tab)
- security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-42027.json (opens in a new tab)
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:65126 (opens in a new tab)