VulnerabilityPublished 1 May 2026Updated 8 Oct 2026

CVE-2026-43023: Linux kernel · Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect()

Affects Linux kernelSource GCVE Database

Mentioned vulnerabilities

CVE-2026-46209

Authoritative record:CVE-2026-43023· High 7.8

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.8 High · fixed in 6.8.0-1061.64~22.04.1 : patch Linux kernel soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

7.8High

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.09% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 0% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 6.8.0-1061.64~22.04.1, 6.8.0-1063.71~22.04.1, 6.8.0-1062.69~22.04.1 +31

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack Vector: Local
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: Low
User Interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: High
Availability: High

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Local: The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Either: the attacker exploits the vulnerability by accessing the target system locally (e.g., keyboard, console), or remotely (e.g., SSH); or the attacker relies on User Interaction by another person to perform actions required to exploit the vulnerability (e.g., tricking a legitimate user into opening a malicious document).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: Low: The attacker is authorized with (i.e., requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without any interaction from any user.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: High: There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact.
Integrity: High: There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability: High: There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 1 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponised: Public exploit code exists in Metasploit or Exploit-DB, or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Patches and advisories

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-nvidia`pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-nvidia?arch=source&distro=resolute`Other threats	Affected <7.0.0-1006.6	Fixed in 7.0.0-1006.6
Ubuntu 25.10linux`pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux?arch=source&distro=questing`Other threats	Affected 6.14.0-15.15 – 6.17.0-40.40 20 affected builds	Fixed in–
Ubuntu 25.10linux-aws`pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-aws?arch=source&distro=questing`Other threats	Affected 6.14.0-1005.5 – 6.17.0-1019.19 17 affected builds	Fixed in–
Ubuntu 25.10linux-azure`pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-azure?arch=source&distro=questing`Other threats	Affected 6.14.0-1004.4 – 6.17.0-1020.20 16 affected builds	Fixed in–
Ubuntu 25.10linux-azure-fde`pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-azure-fde?arch=source&distro=questing`Other threats	Affected 6.17.0-1003.3 – 6.17.0-1017.17 10 affected builds	Fixed in–
Ubuntu 25.10linux-gcp`pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-gcp?arch=source&distro=questing`Other threats	Affected 6.14.0-1006.6 – 6.17.0-1020.22 17 affected builds	Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect() sco_sock_connect() checks sk_state and sk_type without holding the socket lock. Two concurrent connect() syscalls on the same socket can both pass the check and enter sco_connect(), leading to use-after-free. The buggy scenario involves three participants and was confirmed with additional logging instrumentation: Thread A (connect): HCI disconnect: Thread B (connect): sco_sock_connect(sk) sco_sock_connect(sk) sk_state==BT_OPEN sk_state==BT_OPEN (pass, no lock) (pass, no lock) sco_connect(sk): sco_connect(sk): hci_dev_lock hci_dev_lock hci_connect_sco <- blocked -> hcon1 sco_conn_add->conn1 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: conn1->sk = sk sk->conn = conn1 sk_state=BT_CONNECT release_sock hci_dev_unlock hci_dev_lock sco_conn_del: lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_del: sk->conn=NULL conn1->sk=NULL sk_state= BT_CLOSED SOCK_ZAPPED release_sock hci_dev_unlock (unblocked) hci_connect_sco -> hcon2 sco_conn_add -> conn2 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: sk->conn=conn2 sk_state= BT_CONNECT // zombie sk! release_sock hci_dev_unlock Thread B revives a BT_CLOSED + SOCK_ZAPPED socket back to BT_CONNECT. Subsequent cleanup triggers double sock_put() and use-after-free. Meanwhile conn1 is leaked as it was orphaned when sco_conn_del() cleared the association. Fix this by: - Moving lock_sock() before the sk_state/sk_type checks in sco_sock_connect() to serialize concurrent connect attempts - Fixing the sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET check to actually return the error instead of just assigning it - Adding a state re-check in sco_connect() after lock_sock() to catch state changes during the window between the locks - Adding sco_pi(sk)->conn check in sco_chan_add() to prevent double-attach of a socket to multiple connections - Adding hci_conn_drop() on sco_chan_add failure to prevent HCI connection leaks

References

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