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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-44309: sigstore gitsign · Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

Affects sigstore gitsignSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium : upgrade to 0.16.0 when convenient.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.3Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 3% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.16.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 15 May 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade gitsign and github.com/sigstore/gitsign to 0.16.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
sigstoregitsignAffected
  • <0.16.0
Fixed in
  • 0.16.0
Gogithub.com/sigstore/gitsignpkg:golang/github.com/sigstore/gitsignOther threatsAffected
  • <0.16.0
Fixed in
  • 0.16.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Upgrade gitsign to version 0.16.0 or later, where this signature verification issue is fixed. Patch status is not explicitly confirmed in the provided data; therefore, check the vendor advisory for the latest remediation guidance.

Description

Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. Prior to 0.16.0, gitsign verify and gitsign verify-tag re-encode commit/tag objects through go-git's EncodeWithoutSignature before checking the signature, instead of verifying against the raw git object bytes. For malformed objects with duplicate tree headers, git-core and go-git parse different trees: git-core uses the first, go-git uses the second. A signature crafted over the go-git-normalized form (second tree) passes gitsign verify while git-core resolves the commit to a completely different tree. This breaks the invariant that a verified signature, the commit semantics git-core presents to users, and the object hash logged in Rekor all refer to the same content. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.16.0.

References

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