CVE-2026-44309: sigstore gitsign · Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Affects sigstore gitsignSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium : upgrade to 0.16.0 when convenient.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 3% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.16.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 15 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade gitsign and github.com/sigstore/gitsign to 0.16.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| sigstoregitsign | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Gogithub.com/sigstore/gitsignpkg:golang/github.com/sigstore/gitsignOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Upgrade gitsign to version 0.16.0 or later, where this signature verification issue is fixed. Patch status is not explicitly confirmed in the provided data; therefore, check the vendor advisory for the latest remediation guidance.
Description
Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. Prior to 0.16.0, gitsign verify and gitsign verify-tag re-encode commit/tag objects through go-git's EncodeWithoutSignature before checking the signature, instead of verifying against the raw git object bytes. For malformed objects with duplicate tree headers, git-core and go-git parse different trees: git-core uses the first, go-git uses the second. A signature crafted over the go-git-normalized form (second tree) passes gitsign verify while git-core resolves the commit to a completely different tree. This breaks the invariant that a verified signature, the commit semantics git-core presents to users, and the object hash logged in Rekor all refer to the same content. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.16.0.