CVE-2026-44471: GitoxideLabs gitoxide · Link Following
Affects GitoxideLabs gitoxideSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.8 High : upgrade to 0.21.1 soon.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 21% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.21.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 13 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade gitoxide and github/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide to 0.21.1.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| GitoxideLabsgitoxide | Affected
| Fixed in
|
crates.iogithub/GitoxideLabs/gitoxidepkg:cargo/github/GitoxideLabs/gitoxideOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
A fix for this vulnerability is included in gitoxide version 0.21.1. Users should upgrade to version 0.21.1 or later to remediate this issue. Patch status is not explicitly confirmed beyond this version update; therefore, users should consult the official GitoxideLabs advisories or repositories for the latest remediation details. Until patched, avoid checking out untrusted repositories with vulnerable gitoxide versions.
Description
gitoxide is an implementation of git written in Rust. Prior to 0.21.1, a malicious tree can be constructed that will, when checked out with gitoxide, permit writing an attacker-controlled symlink into any existing directory the user has write access to. During checkout, all symlink index entries are deferred and created after regular files using a single shared gix_worktree::Stack. Internally, this uses a gix_fs::Stack. gix_fs::Stack::make_relative_path_current() caches validated path prefixes: when the previously-processed leaf component exactly matches the leading component(s) of the next path, the leaf-to-directory transition at gix-fs/src/stack.rs invokes only delegate.push_directory(), never delegate.push(). In gix_worktree::stack::delegate::StackDelegate, when the state member is State::CreateDirectoryAndAttributesStack, Attributes::push_directory() only loads attributes (from the ODB, in the clone case), and does not perform any other checks. The on-disk symlink_metadata() check and unlink-on-collision live in StackDelegate::push()'s invocation of create_leading_directory(), which is therefore bypassed for the cached prefix. The final symlink is created with plain std::os::unix::fs::symlink, which follows symlinks in parent directories. Therefore, it's possible to provide a tree with duplicate symlink and directory entries that exploits this. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.21.1.