CVE-2026-45844: Linux kernel · netfilter: arp_tables: fix IEEE1394 ARP payload parsing
Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · fixed in ad9973df8e0eeb123d9ec4d18828e05b7d44ff4b : update Linux kernel when convenient.
Data as of 6 Nov 2026, 16:04 UTC
Rated by Threat Radar · No CVSS score from NVD or the CNA
Thin evidence
One scorer or none- CISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
- Automatable
- Attackers cannot reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
- Technical impact
- Limited control over the software or limited information exposure
CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-11-06.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in ad9973df8e0eeb123d9ec4d18828e05b7d44ff4b, ac698d81fd6619c7504cee913f1cab5285fba1b7, 84e8536c981338d0d8cc6e712cf71a936a93e13f +5
Exploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 27 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 6 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: arp_tables: fix IEEE1394 ARP payload parsing Weiming Shi says: "arp_packet_match() unconditionally parses the ARP payload assuming two hardware addresses are present (source and target). However, IPv4-over-IEEE1394 ARP (RFC 2734) omits the target hardware address field, and arp_hdr_len() already accounts for this by returning a shorter length for ARPHRD_IEEE1394 devices. As a result, on IEEE1394 interfaces arp_packet_match() advances past a nonexistent target hardware address and reads the wrong bytes for both the target device address comparison and the target IP address. This causes arptables rules to match against garbage data, leading to incorrect filtering decisions: packets that should be accepted may be dropped and vice versa. The ARP stack in net/ipv4/arp.c (arp_create and arp_process) already handles this correctly by skipping the target hardware address for ARPHRD_IEEE1394. Apply the same pattern to arp_packet_match()." Mangle the original patch to always return 0 (no match) in case user matches on the target hardware address which is never present in IEEE1394. Note that this returns 0 (no match) for either normal and inverse match because matching in the target hardware address in ARPHRD_IEEE1394 has never been supported by arptables. This is intentional, matching on the target hardware address should never evaluate true for ARPHRD_IEEE1394. Moreover, adjust arpt_mangle to drop the packet too as AI suggests: In arpt_mangle, the logic assumes a standard ARP layout. Because IEEE1394 (FireWire) omits the target hardware address, the linear pointer arithmetic miscalculates the offset for the target IP address. This causes mangling operations to write to the wrong location, leading to packet corruption. To ensure safety, this patch drops packets (NF_DROP) when mangling is requested for these fields on IEEE1394 devices, as the current implementation cannot correctly map the FireWire ARP payload. This omits both mangling target hardware and IP address. Even if IP address mangling should be possible in IEEE1394, this would require to adjust arpt_mangle offset calculation, which has never been supported. Based on patch from Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>.
References
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f23a1457695f1a61f64367e39f0f9cfa29947d1 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e285362ef7096eb12733370d59e033f4a1d294a (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/84e8536c981338d0d8cc6e712cf71a936a93e13f (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad9973df8e0eeb123d9ec4d18828e05b7d44ff4b (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/03ea11dbefaa55c502735ee551c89ef773fe753b (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c55053f8ffdc060006df898fd3664e3d1bfac7b (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac698d81fd6619c7504cee913f1cab5285fba1b7 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e8e3f449b1e73b73a843257635b9c50f0cc0f0a (opens in a new tab)
- cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html (opens in a new tab)