CVE-2026-46130: Linux kernel · take 3
Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · fixed in dac69d1b76049d7e5f565089a6a7f4502a85b9de : update Linux kernel when convenient.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 13:47 UTC
Rated by Threat Radar · No CVSS score from NVD or the CNA
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 2% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in dac69d1b76049d7e5f565089a6a7f4502a85b9de, d47281b9a4472cfd73122393e79fbe76b651e46a, 03348b440f69417dc3a3c71d8271cff6b05f67fb +5
Exploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 28 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-verity-fec: fix reading parity bytes split across blocks (take 3) fec_decode_bufs() assumes that the parity bytes of the first RS codeword it decodes are never split across parity blocks. This assumption is false. Consider v->fec->block_size == 4096 && v->fec->roots == 17 && fio->nbufs == 1, for example. In that case, each call to fec_decode_bufs() consumes v->fec->roots * (fio->nbufs << DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS) = 272 parity bytes. Considering that the parity data for each message block starts on a block boundary, the byte alignment in the parity data will iterate through 272*i mod 4096 until the 3 parity blocks have been consumed. On the 16th call (i=15), the alignment will be 4080 bytes into the first block. Only 16 bytes remain in that block, but 17 parity bytes will be needed. The code reads out-of-bounds from the parity block buffer. Fortunately this doesn't normally happen, since it can occur only for certain non-default values of fec_roots *and* when the maximum number of buffers couldn't be allocated due to low memory. For example with block_size=4096 only the following cases are affected: fec_roots=17: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 15] fec_roots=19: nbufs in [1, 229] fec_roots=21: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 13, 15, 39, 65, 195] fec_roots=23: nbufs in [1, 89] Regardless, fix it by refactoring how the parity blocks are read.
References
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/03348b440f69417dc3a3c71d8271cff6b05f67fb (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/dac69d1b76049d7e5f565089a6a7f4502a85b9de (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/d47281b9a4472cfd73122393e79fbe76b651e46a (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d1b4e2d8ac0a1a1390a117f61ce0ca1c47e3bcb (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/430a05cb926f6bdf53e81460a2c3a553257f3f61 (opens in a new tab)