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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-46275: Linux kernel · Race Condition

Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.8 High · fixed in e2d19969c8d9198ecc3090bcd5312ecd503a3339 : patch Linux kernel soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 13:47 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.8High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 13% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CISA SSVC
Exploitation
No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
Automatable
Attackers cannot reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
Technical impact
Total control over the software or total information disclosure

CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-10-16.

Patch
Available – fixed in e2d19969c8d9198ecc3090bcd5312ecd503a3339, c85cff648a2bc92322912db5f1727ad05afae7b6, c1bb9336ae6b54a5f6a353c4bd4ed9a4307e429b +10
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 8 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • >=4.14.203 <4.15
  • >=4.19.153 <4.20
  • >=5.4.73 <5.5
  • >=5.8.17 <5.9
  • >=5.9.2 <5.10
Fixed in
  • e2d19969c8d9198ecc3090bcd5312ecd503a3339
  • c85cff648a2bc92322912db5f1727ad05afae7b6
  • c1bb9336ae6b54a5f6a353c4bd4ed9a4307e429b
  • 7338031946bd06f6dff149e67b60c4cd083bfea8
  • 192cb0f1ca706d9a1bc36ae0ad5f666d1e4fd894
  • 81c7a3c22a0f2808cf4ae0b4908f59763b23606d
  • 78aad93e938f013d9272fe0ee168f27883afa95c
  • 9d20d48be2c4a071fb015eb09bda2cecd25daf34
  • 5.10
  • 5.9
  • 5.5
  • 4.20
  • 4.15
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • =5.10
Fixed in–

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_uart: fix UAFs and race conditions in close and init paths Vulnerabilities leading to Use-After-Free (UAF) and Null Pointer Dereference (NPD) conditions were observed in the lifecycle management of hci_uart. The primary issue arises because the workqueues (init_ready and write_work) are only flushed/cancelled if the HCI_UART_PROTO_READY flag is set during TTY close. If a hangup occurs before setup completes, hci_uart_tty_close() skips the teardown of these workqueues and proceeds to free the `hu` struct. When the scheduled work executes later, it blindly dereferences the freed `hu` struct. Furthermore, several data races and UAFs were identified in the teardown sequence: 1. Calling hci_uart_flush() from hci_uart_close() without effectively disabling write_work causes a race condition where both can concurrently double-free hu->tx_skb. This happens because protocol timers can concurrently invoke hci_uart_tx_wakeup() and requeue write_work. 2. Calling hci_free_dev(hdev) before hu->proto->close(hu) causes a UAF when vendor specific protocol close callbacks dereference hu->hdev. 3. In the initialization error paths, failing to take the proto_lock write lock before clearing PROTO_READY leads to races with active readers. Additionally, hci_uart_tty_receive() accesses hu->hdev outside the read lock, leading to UAFs if the initialization error path frees hdev concurrently. Fix these synchronization and lifecycle issues by: 1. Re-ordering hci_uart_tty_close() to clear HCI_UART_PROTO_READY first, followed immediately by a cancel_work_sync(&hu->write_work). Clearing the flag locks out concurrent protocol timers from successfully invoking hci_uart_tx_wakeup(), effectively rendering the cancellation permanent and preventing the tx_skb double-free. 2. Note: Clearing PROTO_READY early causes hci_uart_close() to skip hu->proto->flush(). This is perfectly safe in the tty_close path because hu->proto->close() executes shortly after, which intrinsically purges all protocol SKB queues and tears down the state. 3. Relocating hu->proto->close(hu) strictly prior to hci_free_dev(hdev) across all close and error paths to prevent vendor-level UAFs. 4. Moving the hdev->stat.byte_rx increment in hci_uart_tty_receive() inside the proto_lock read-side critical section to safely synchronize with device unregistration. 5. Adding cancel_work_sync(&hu->write_work) to hci_uart_close() to safely flush the workqueue before hci_uart_flush() is invoked via the HCI core. 6. Utilizing cancel_work_sync() instead of disable_work_sync() across all paths to prevent permanently breaking user-space retry capabilities.

References

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