CVE-2026-46539: nimiq core-rs-albatross · Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Affects nimiq core-rs-albatrossSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.9 Medium : upgrade to 1.4.0 when convenient.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 4% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.4.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 9 Jun 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade core-rs-albatross and github/nimiq/core-rs-albatross to 1.4.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| nimiqcore-rs-albatross | Affected
| Fixed in
|
crates.iogithub/nimiq/core-rs-albatrosspkg:cargo/github/nimiq/core-rs-albatrossOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Upgrade to Nimiq core-rs-albatross version 1.4.0 or later, where this vulnerability is patched. No other mitigation is indicated or required.
Description
Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.4.0, a logic flaw in BlockInclusionProof::is_block_proven causes the function to return true without performing any cryptographic verification when get_interlink_hops yields an empty hop list. This occurs when the target block is at the election block position immediately preceding the election head's epoch. An attacker providing transaction inclusion proofs can forge a MacroBlock header for that epoch position and have it accepted as "proven" without any hash or signature verification. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.