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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-47172: duck-organization quest-bot · Untrusted Functionality Inclusion

Affects duck-organization quest-botSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.5 Critical : upgrade to 1.0.3 as a priority.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
9.5Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 35% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.0.3
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 11 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: evidence found.

    Public exploit code: GitHub proofs of concept

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), GitHub proofs of concept, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade quest-bot and duck-organization/questbot to 1.0.3.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
duck-organizationquest-botAffected
  • <1.0.3
Fixed in
  • 1.0.3
GitHubduck-organization/questbotpkg:github/duck-organization/questbotOther threatsAffected
  • <1.0.3
Fixed in
  • 1.0.3

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Upgrade quest-bot to version 1.0.3 or later, where this vulnerability is patched. No other mitigation is required as the issue is resolved in the fixed version.

Description

Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3.

References

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