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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-47712: jelmer dulwich · Path Traversal

Affects jelmer dulwichSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 3.3 Low : upgrade to 1.2.5 when convenient.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
3.3Low
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 3% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.2.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 10 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade jelmer dulwich to 1.2.5.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
jelmerdulwichAffected
  • >=0.24.0 <1.2.5
Fixed in
  • 1.2.5
PyPIdulwichpkg:pypi/dulwichOther threatsAffected
  • >=0.24.0 <1.2.5
Fixed in
  • 1.2.5

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Users should upgrade to Dulwich version 1.2.5 or later where this vulnerability is fixed. Until upgrading, callers processing untrusted commits should use the stdout=True option to avoid automatic filename generation, validate resolved patch file paths to ensure they remain within the intended directory, and/or pre-screen commit subjects to reject those containing unsafe characters such as /, \, or .. in the first line. These mitigations reduce the risk of path traversal until an official fix is applied.

Description

### Impact dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit's subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \), parent-directory components (..), and other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :) were preserved verbatim and passed straight into os.path.join(outdir, f"{i:04d}-{summary}.patch"). A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. Reduced examples: - x/../../x produced <outdir>/0001-x/../../x.patch, resolving two directories above outdir. - x\..\..\x produced the equivalent escape on Windows, here \ is also a path separator. Related issues from the same root cause: - Subjects containing characters that are illegal in Windows filenames (e.g. :) caused format_patch to fail outright on Windows, where git would have succeeded. - Very long subjects produced excessively long filenames that could exceed filesystem limits; git truncates them. Anyone calling porcelain.format_patch (or the dulwich format-patch CLI) against untrusted commits - for example, a service that runs format-patch over user-supplied repositories or pull requests - could have patch files written to attacker-chosen locations within the process's write permissions. ### Patches Fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade. dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git's format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other characters collapse to a single -, consecutive . collapse to a single ., trailing ./- are stripped, and the result is length-limited. This makes the returned string safe to embed as a filename component, so format_patch can no longer be steered out of outdir via the commit subject. ### Workarounds Until upgrading, callers that pass untrusted commits to porcelain.format_patch can: - Use stdout=True and write the patch to a destination they control, rather than letting format_patch choose the filename. - Validate the chosen path before opening - e.g. compare os.path.realpath(returned_path) against os.path.realpath(outdir) and reject any patch whose resolved path is not inside outdir. - Pre-screen commits and refuse to format any whose subject's first line contains /, \, .., or other characters that are not safe on the target filesystem. ### Resources - Fix commit: https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/commit/c2446e51b - Affected API: dulwich.porcelain.format_patch / dulwich format-patch - Reference behavior: git's format_sanitized_subject in pretty.c

References

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