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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-48100: polybase payy · Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data

Affects polybase payySource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High : upgrade to 1.3.0 soon.

Data as of 12 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
8.7High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 7% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.3.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 28 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade payy and polybase/payy to 1.3.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
polybasepayyAffected
  • <1.3.0
Fixed in
  • 1.3.0
GitHubpolybase/payypkg:github/polybase/payyOther threatsAffected
  • <1.3.0
Fixed in
  • 1.3.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

This vulnerability has been patched in Payy version 1.3.0. Users and operators should upgrade to version 1.3.0 or later to remediate this issue. The current deployment restricts proof submission to allowlisted provers, which limits exploitation risk, but upgrading is necessary to fully resolve the circuit soundness failure.

Description

Payy is an Ethereum L2 zk-rollup for privacy preserving and regulatory compliant transactions. Prior to version 1.3.0, agg_agg forwards the compacted message stream from its inner proofs into a public messages: [Field; 1000] array, but it never checks that the unused tail of the outer array is zero. A registered prover can build a valid agg_final proof for an approved rollup block while inserting an extra burn message after the real messages. RollupV1.verifyRollup() then parses that public input as a normal burn and transfers USDC from the rollup contract to the attacker. This is a severe circuit soundness failure: the proof system accepts a public statement whose messages array is not fully derived from the verified inner proofs. On the current deployment, verifyRollup() is restricted to the existing allowlisted prover, so a fresh public caller cannot submit the invalid proof directly. That gate limits who can reach L1 today; it does not make the circuit statement sound. The issue becomes permissionless under the prover model described in the Payy whitepaper. Section 3.3.2 states: "To join as a prover, the prover is required to submit a small stake", and Section 3.3.1 states that if a prover fails to submit, "other nodes can submit the block proof instead." In that model, an attacker only needs to become a registered prover and use public validator approval data for an already approved block. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.

References

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