CVE-2026-48100: CWE-349: Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data in polybase payy
Payy is an Ethereum L2 zk-rollup for privacy preserving and regulatory compliant transactions. Prior to version 1.3.0, agg_agg forwards the compacted message stream from its inner proofs into a public messages: [Field; 1000] array, but it never checks that the unused tail of the outer array is zero. A registered prover can build a valid agg_final proof for an approved rollup block while inserting an extra burn message after the real messages. RollupV1.verifyRollup() then parses that public input as a normal burn and transfers USDC from the rollup contract to the attacker. This is a severe circuit soundness failure: the proof system accepts a public statement whose messages array is not fully derived from the verified inner proofs. On the current deployment, verifyRollup() is restricted to the existing allowlisted prover, so a fresh public caller cannot submit the invalid proof directly. That gate limits who can reach L1 today; it does not make the circuit statement sound. The issue becomes permissionless under the prover model described in the Payy whitepaper. Section 3.3.2 states: "To join as a prover, the prover is required to submit a small stake", and Section 3.3.1 states that if a prover fails to submit, "other nodes can submit the block proof instead." In that model, an attacker only needs to become a registered prover and use public validator approval data for an already approved block. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The vulnerability arises because agg_agg forwards a compacted message stream into a public messages array without checking that the unused tail elements are zero. This leads to a circuit soundness failure where the proof system accepts a public statement containing messages not derived from the verified inner proofs. An attacker who becomes a registered prover can exploit this by inserting an extra burn message after the legitimate messages, causing the RollupV1.verifyRollup() function to parse and execute an unauthorized USDC transfer. The current deployment limits proof submission to an allowlisted prover, preventing direct exploitation by arbitrary public callers. However, under the permissionless prover model, any registered prover who stakes can submit such invalid proofs. The vulnerability is fixed in Payy version 1.3.0.
Potential Impact
An attacker who is a registered prover can create a valid agg_final proof containing unauthorized burn messages, leading to unauthorized USDC transfers from the rollup contract to the attacker. This compromises the integrity of the rollup's transaction proofs and results in financial loss. The vulnerability represents a severe circuit soundness failure in the zk-rollup proof system. Current deployments restrict proof submission to allowlisted provers, limiting immediate exploitation, but the vulnerability is exploitable in permissionless prover environments.
Mitigation Recommendations
This vulnerability has been patched in Payy version 1.3.0. Users and operators should upgrade to version 1.3.0 or later to remediate this issue. The current deployment restricts proof submission to allowlisted provers, which limits exploitation risk, but upgrading is necessary to fully resolve the circuit soundness failure.
CVE-2026-48100: CWE-349: Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data in polybase payy
Description
Payy is an Ethereum L2 zk-rollup for privacy preserving and regulatory compliant transactions. Prior to version 1.3.0, agg_agg forwards the compacted message stream from its inner proofs into a public messages: [Field; 1000] array, but it never checks that the unused tail of the outer array is zero. A registered prover can build a valid agg_final proof for an approved rollup block while inserting an extra burn message after the real messages. RollupV1.verifyRollup() then parses that public input as a normal burn and transfers USDC from the rollup contract to the attacker. This is a severe circuit soundness failure: the proof system accepts a public statement whose messages array is not fully derived from the verified inner proofs. On the current deployment, verifyRollup() is restricted to the existing allowlisted prover, so a fresh public caller cannot submit the invalid proof directly. That gate limits who can reach L1 today; it does not make the circuit statement sound. The issue becomes permissionless under the prover model described in the Payy whitepaper. Section 3.3.2 states: "To join as a prover, the prover is required to submit a small stake", and Section 3.3.1 states that if a prover fails to submit, "other nodes can submit the block proof instead." In that model, an attacker only needs to become a registered prover and use public validator approval data for an already approved block. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.
CVSS v4.0
Score 8.7high
Affected software
polybase
payy
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Weaknesses
AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The vulnerability arises because agg_agg forwards a compacted message stream into a public messages array without checking that the unused tail elements are zero. This leads to a circuit soundness failure where the proof system accepts a public statement containing messages not derived from the verified inner proofs. An attacker who becomes a registered prover can exploit this by inserting an extra burn message after the legitimate messages, causing the RollupV1.verifyRollup() function to parse and execute an unauthorized USDC transfer. The current deployment limits proof submission to an allowlisted prover, preventing direct exploitation by arbitrary public callers. However, under the permissionless prover model, any registered prover who stakes can submit such invalid proofs. The vulnerability is fixed in Payy version 1.3.0.
Potential Impact
An attacker who is a registered prover can create a valid agg_final proof containing unauthorized burn messages, leading to unauthorized USDC transfers from the rollup contract to the attacker. This compromises the integrity of the rollup's transaction proofs and results in financial loss. The vulnerability represents a severe circuit soundness failure in the zk-rollup proof system. Current deployments restrict proof submission to allowlisted provers, limiting immediate exploitation, but the vulnerability is exploitable in permissionless prover environments.
Mitigation Recommendations
This vulnerability has been patched in Payy version 1.3.0. Users and operators should upgrade to version 1.3.0 or later to remediate this issue. The current deployment restricts proof submission to allowlisted provers, which limits exploitation risk, but upgrading is necessary to fully resolve the circuit soundness failure.
Technical Details
- Data Version
- 5.2
- Assigner Short Name
- GitHub_M
- Date Reserved
- 2026-05-20T18:40:45.835Z
- Cvss Version
- 4.0
- State
- PUBLISHED
Threat ID: 6aba9de2f7a7c54106f66c90
Added to database: 09/28/2026, 17:03:30 UTC
Last enriched: 09/28/2026, 17:17:52 UTC
Last updated: 09/29/2026, 02:50:09 UTC
Views: 13
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