CVE-2026-48103: mcmilk 7-Zip · Out-of-bounds Read
Affects mcmilk 7-ZipSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.3 Medium : upgrade to 26.01 when convenient.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC
- EPSS
- 2.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 82% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 26.01
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:LExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 5 Jun 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade mcmilk 7-Zip to 26.01.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| mcmilk7-Zip | Affected
| Fixed in
|
AI-suggested
Until then, cautious handling of untrusted WIM, SWM, ESD, and PPKG files is advised to avoid triggering the vulnerability.
Description
7-Zip is a file archiver with a high compression ratio. Versions 9.34 through 26.00 contain an off-by-one heap out-of-bounds read in the WIM (Windows Imaging) archive handler's security descriptor lookup. In CHandler::GetSecurity (CPP/7zip/Archive/Wim/WimHandler.cpp), the per-image SecurOffsets table holds numEntries + 1 cumulative offsets, but the check securityId >= SecurOffsets.Size() admits securityId == numEntries, and the function then reads SecurOffsets[securityId + 1], fetching one UInt32 past the end of the heap-allocated CRecordVector (which performs no bounds checking on operator[]). The securityId is attacker-controlled at offset +0xC of any directory entry in WIM metadata, and the handler is registered for .wim, .swm, .esd, and .ppkg and enabled by default in stock 7z.dll; the OOB triggers zero-click in the GUI because 7zFM.exe's ListView calls GetRawProp(kpidNtSecure) for every item during listing (ASan-confirmed), and is also reachable via CLI listing with 7zz l -slt. Impact is limited to denial of service under hardened allocators and minor information disclosure, since the OOB value is only consumed arithmetically as a length and is not surfaced to the attacker; there is no write primitive.