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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-48685: fastnetmon · Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency

Affects fastnetmonSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.5 Medium.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
6.5Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 21% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 26 May 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
GitHubpavel-odintsov/fastnetmonpkg:github/pavel-odintsov/fastnetmonOther threatsAffected
  • <=1.2.9
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Until a patch is released, users should monitor vendor communications for updates. No specific workaround or temporary fix is documented in the provided information.

Description

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 has out-of-bounds memory access because it incorrectly parses BGP path attributes with the extended length flag set. In src/bgp_protocol.hpp, the parse_raw_bgp_attribute() function correctly identifies when extended_length_bit is set and sets length_of_length_field to 2, but then reads only a single byte for the attribute value length (attribute_value_length = value[2] at line 173). Per RFC 4271 Section 4.3, when the Extended Length bit is set, the Attribute Length field is two octets and the value should be read as a 16-bit big-endian integer from value[2] and value[3]. As a result, any attribute longer than 255 bytes has its length silently truncated to the low byte (e.g., 300 bytes = 0x012C is read as 0x2C = 44 bytes). The remaining 256 bytes are then misinterpreted as subsequent attributes, causing cascading parse failures and potential out-of-bounds memory access.

References

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