CVE-2026-48687: fastnetmon · OS Command Injection
Affects fastnetmonSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.1 High.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC
- EPSS
- 1.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 76% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 26 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
GitHubpavel-odintsov/fastnetmonpkg:github/pavel-odintsov/fastnetmonOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
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AI-suggested
Until an official fix is available, avoid invoking the vulnerable PHP script directly with untrusted input. Review any orchestration or automation systems that call this script to ensure they do not pass unsanitized or user-controlled data. Consider code review and applying manual mitigations such as replacing exec() calls with safer functions like file_put_contents() or applying proper shell argument escaping (e.g., escapeshellarg()) if you maintain the codebase.
Description
FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec("echo `date` \"- {FASTNETMON] - " . $msg . " \" >> " . $FILE_LOG_TMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon's C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inet_ntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters.