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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-48688: fastnetmon · Out-of-bounds Read

Affects fastnetmonSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.5High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 20% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 26 May 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
GitHubpavel-odintsov/fastnetmonpkg:github/pavel-odintsov/fastnetmonOther threatsAffected
  • <=1.2.9
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Until an official fix is released, users should consider restricting exposure of vulnerable FastNetMon instances to untrusted networks to reduce risk. Monitor vendor channels for updates and apply patches promptly once available.

Description

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains multiple out-of-bounds reads in the BGP MP_REACH_NLRI IPv6 attribute decoder. The function decode_mp_reach_ipv6() in src/bgp_protocol.cpp contains a TODO comment at line 156 explicitly acknowledging 'we should add sanity checks to avoid reads after attribute memory block.' The function casts raw pointers to structure types without verifying sufficient data exists (line 158), uses the attacker-controlled length_of_next_hop field to determine memcpy size (line 181), and computes prefix_length by dereferencing a pointer calculated from multiple attacker-controlled offsets without bounds validation (line 189). The prefix_length is then used to calculate number_of_bytes_required_for_prefix which becomes a memcpy length (line 202) with no check against remaining buffer size.

References

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