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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-48716: HKUDS nanobot · Path Traversal

Affects HKUDS nanobotSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High.

Data as of 31 Oct 2026, 20:20 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
8.7High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 25% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 18 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 31 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
HKUDSnanobotAffected
  • <=0.1.5.post3
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

A fix is planned for version 0.1.5.post4. Until then, users should avoid exposing the WhatsApp bridge to untrusted sources or disable the WhatsApp bridge component if possible. Monitor the vendor advisory for the release of the official patch and apply it promptly once available.

Description

nanobot is a personal AI assistant. In versions 0.1.5.post3 and prior, the WhatsApp bridge in bridge/src/whatsapp.ts constructs a filesystem path using the fileName field from an incoming WhatsApp document message without sanitization. The WhatsApp bridge downloads media attachments and writes them to disk using a filename derived from the sender's message via documentMessage.fileName, which is concatenated with a prefix and its raw value is passed directly to path.join(mediaDir, outFilename). Node.js path.join resolves .. components, allowing an attacker to escape the intended media/ directory by sending a document with a crafted fileName such as ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys. Because the attacker also controls the file content (the downloaded buffer), this is a write-anywhere primitive — both path and content are attacker-controlled. A fix for this issue is planned for version 0.1.5.post4.

References

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