CVE-2026-49457: benoitc erlang_quic · Improper Certificate Validation
Affects benoitc erlang_quicSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical : upgrade to 1.4.4 as a priority.
Data as of 12 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 16% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.4.4
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 14 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade erlang_quic and benoitc/erlang_quic to 1.4.4.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| benoitcerlang_quic | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubbenoitc/erlang_quicpkg:github/benoitc/erlang_quicOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Upgrade to erlang_quic version 1.4.4 or later, where proper certificate verification is implemented and enabled by default. Versions prior to 1.4.4 have no effective workaround. Do not disable verification by setting verify => false unless for testing with self-signed certificates, as this disables security checks.
Description
erlang_quic is a pure Erlang QUIC implementation. Prior to version 1.4.4, the QUIC client did not authenticate the server during the TLS 1.3 handshake. The CertificateVerify signature was not checked, the certificate chain was not validated, and the hostname was not compared against the certificate, so `verify` was effectively a no-op on the client. A man-in-the-middle on the network path could present any certificate and impersonate any server, defeating the confidentiality and integrity of the connection. HTTP/3 uses the same client and was equally affected. Handshakes authenticated by a PSK (session resumption) are not affected, because the peer is authenticated by the PSK binder and no certificate is sent. This is fixed in 1.4.4. The client now verifies the CertificateVerify signature, validates the certificate chain against the trust store (`cacerts` option, the operating system store by default), and checks the hostname. Client `verify` now defaults to on; set `verify => false` to accept any certificate (for example a self-signed test server). No known workarounds are available before 1.4.4. `verify => true` had no effect, and inspecting the certificate after connecting does not help because without the signature check the peer is never proven to own the certificate it presents.