CVE-2026-5080: BIGPRESH Dancer::Session::Abstract · Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers
Affects BIGPRESH Dancer::Session::AbstractSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.9 Medium.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 29% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 30 Apr 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| BIGPRESHDancer::Session::Abstract | Affected
| Fixed in– |
GitHubDancerpkg:github/DancerOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Until an official fix is available, users should consider implementing alternative secure session ID generation methods that use cryptographically secure random number generators. Avoid relying on the built-in rand() function for security-sensitive identifiers.
Description
Dancer::Session::Abstract versions through 1.3522 for Perl generates session ids insecurely. The session id is generated from summing the character codepoints of the absolute pathname with the process id, the epoch time and calls to the built-in rand() function to return a number between 0 and 999-billion, and concatenating that result three times. The path name might be known or guessed by an attacker, especially for applications known to be written using Dancer with standard installation locations. The epoch time can be guessed by an attacker, and may be leaked in the HTTP header. The process id comes from a small set of numbers, and workers may have sequential process ids. The built-in rand() function is seeded with 32-bits and is considered unsuitable for security applications. Predictable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems.