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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-52737: ZcashFoundation zebra · Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Affects ZcashFoundation zebraSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium : upgrade to 4.5.0 when convenient.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 13:47 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.3Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 17% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CISA SSVC
Exploitation
No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
Automatable
Attackers can reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
Technical impact
Limited control over the software or limited information exposure

CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-08-18.

Patch
Available – fixed in 4.5.0, 7.0.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 18 Aug 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade zebra to 4.5.0; zebra-consensus to 7.0.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
ZcashFoundationzebraAffected
  • <4.5.0
Fixed in
  • 4.5.0
ZcashFoundationzebra-consensusAffected
  • <7.0.0
Fixed in
  • 7.0.0

Description

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious unauthenticated P2P peer can answer Zebra's outbound getblocks or FindBlocks request with a small two-hash inventory and then serve a syntactically valid block whose coinbase height is far above the local chain tip. In zebrad/src/components/sync/downloads.rs, BlockDownloadVerifyError::AboveLookaheadHeightLimit originally carried only the block height and hash, so handle_block_response could not attribute the failure to the advertising peer. The error then reached the restart-worthy default path in zebrad/src/components/sync.rs, cancelling all in-flight downloads from honest peers and imposing a 67-second sync restart delay on mainnet. Because the peer was neither scored nor disconnected, the peer could repeat the cycle indefinitely with minimal bandwidth and significantly degrade synchronization without corrupting state. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

References

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