CVE-2026-52737: ZcashFoundation zebra · Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Affects ZcashFoundation zebraSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium : upgrade to 4.5.0 when convenient.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 13:47 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 17% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- CISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
- Automatable
- Attackers can reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
- Technical impact
- Limited control over the software or limited information exposure
CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-08-18.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 4.5.0, 7.0.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:LExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 18 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade zebra to 4.5.0; zebra-consensus to 7.0.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ZcashFoundationzebra | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| ZcashFoundationzebra-consensus | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Description
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious unauthenticated P2P peer can answer Zebra's outbound getblocks or FindBlocks request with a small two-hash inventory and then serve a syntactically valid block whose coinbase height is far above the local chain tip. In zebrad/src/components/sync/downloads.rs, BlockDownloadVerifyError::AboveLookaheadHeightLimit originally carried only the block height and hash, so handle_block_response could not attribute the failure to the advertising peer. The error then reached the restart-worthy default path in zebrad/src/components/sync.rs, cancelling all in-flight downloads from honest peers and imposing a 67-second sync restart delay on mainnet. Because the peer was neither scored nor disconnected, the peer could repeat the cycle indefinitely with minimal bandwidth and significantly degrade synchronization without corrupting state. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
References
- github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-gvjc-3w7c-92jx (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/10647 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/1440b43ca7df59aca948090d45117557b217a6cd (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/bc64dfe45746a86d14546a0a5a766387dd5a2942 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.5.0 (opens in a new tab)