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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-52809: gogs · Use of a Key Past its Expiration Date

Affects gogsSource CVE Database V5

0
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Public exploit available · CVSS 6.8 Medium : upgrade to 0.14.3 as a priority.

Data as of 3 Nov 2026, 22:58 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
6.8Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (GitHub_M)CVSS 3.16.8
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 10% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CISA SSVC
Exploitation
Proof of concept is public or traded
Automatable
Attackers cannot reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
Technical impact
Total control over the software or total information disclosure

CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-06-26.

Patch
Available – fixed in 0.14.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Exploitation evidence

t = 0 is the CVE’s publication on cve.org

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 24 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: evidence found.

    CISA SSVC: proof of concept public

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

Timeline

  1. CVE ID reserved

    by GitHub, Inc.

    , 16 days before disclosure

  2. CVE published

    on cve.org

    , t = 0

  3. CISA SSVC assessment

    proof of concept public

    , 31 hours after disclosure

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), CISA SSVC, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 3 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade gogs to 0.14.3.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
gogsgogsAffected
  • <0.14.3
Fixed in
  • 0.14.3

Description

Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, password-reset tokens are generated using conf.Auth.ActivateCodeLives (the account-activation lifetime), not conf.Auth.ResetPasswordCodeLives. The token lifetime is baked into the token itself at generation time and is re-extracted from the token at verification time, making RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES irrelevant to actual enforcement. When an administrator configures a shorter reset window (e.g., 10 minutes) for compliance or security reasons, reset tokens remain exploitable for the full activation lifetime instead, while the reset email falsely advertises the shorter expiry. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.

References

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