CVE-2026-53431: malach-it boruta · Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
Affects malach-it borutaSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical : upgrade to 2.3.7 as a priority.
Data as of 29 Oct 2026, 07:15 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 43% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 2.3.7
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 30 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade malach-it boruta to 2.3.7.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| malach-itboruta | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| malach-itboruta | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Hexborutapkg:hex/borutaOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
CPE configurations (1)
cpe:2.3:a:malach-it:boruta_auth:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
If you cannot patch yet, avoid exposing JWT client assertions in logs, proxies, or other observability tools to reduce the risk of token capture.
Description
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an attacker who has obtained a previously valid JWT client assertion to authenticate as the issuing OAuth client after the assertion has expired. Boruta accepts JWT-based client authentication (client_secret_jwt and private_key_jwt token endpoint authentication methods) but never enforces that the assertion's exp claim is in the future. The pre-check helper Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.check_expiration/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex only verifies that an exp claim is present (it pattern-matches on the existence of the key and returns success), and the Joken token configuration used for signature verification, Boruta.Oauth.Authorization.Client.Token.token_config/0 in lib/boruta/oauth/authorization/client.ex, returns an empty map, so Joken's default exp claim validator is not engaged either. Any attacker who obtains a validly-signed client assertion (for example through logs, reverse proxies, browser tooling, or other observability surfaces) can replay it indefinitely to authenticate as the client and obtain access tokens with that client's privileges. This issue affects boruta: from 2.3.0 before 2.3.7.
References
- github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/security/advisories/GHSA-xjv8-vmh5-xhf6 (opens in a new tab)
- cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-53431.html (opens in a new tab)
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-53431 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/5204f88f9b2cdd9637a755337ed5f99185be5474 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/69363432aa36760fc5438e4e17115d0f7c1b925a (opens in a new tab)