CVE-2026-54029: danny-avila LibreChat · Missing Authorization
Affects danny-avila LibreChatSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium : upgrade to 0.8.4-rc1 when convenient.
Data as of 7 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 19% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.8.4-rc1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 25 Jun 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 8 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade danny-avila LibreChat to 0.8.4-rc1.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| danny-avilaLibreChat | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubdanny-avila/LibreChatpkg:github/danny-avila/LibreChatOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Upgrade to LibreChat version 0.8.4-rc1 or later where this authorization flaw is fixed. Patch status is not explicitly confirmed beyond the version fix note, so users should verify upgrade availability from the vendor. No other mitigation is indicated.
Description
LibreChat is an enhanced ChatGPT clone that supports multiple AI providers. Prior to 0.8.4-rc1, the DELETE /api/messages/:conversationId/:messageId endpoint allows any authenticated user to delete any other user's messages. The validateMessageReq middleware only validates that the conversationId belongs to the requesting user, but the handler calls deleteMessages({ messageId }) using only the messageId as the MongoDB filter — without adding a user constraint. An attacker provides their own valid conversationId (to pass validation) and the victim's messageId (to target deletion), resulting in permanent, irrecoverable message deletion. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.4-rc1.