CVE-2026-57079: SANKO Net::BitTorrent · Path Traversal
Affects SANKO Net::BitTorrentSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium : upgrade to 2.1.0 when convenient.
Data as of 12 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 35% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 2.1.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 30 Jun 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade Net::BitTorrent and Net-BitTorrent to 2.1.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| SANKONet::BitTorrent | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubNet-BitTorrentpkg:github/Net-BitTorrentOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Users should upgrade to Net::BitTorrent version 2.1.0 or later where this issue is fixed. Until then, avoid using untrusted peers or magnet links and consider restricting file system permissions to limit the impact of unauthorized file writes.
Description
Net::BitTorrent versions before 2.1.0 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata. Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse "..". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing ".." segments therefore resolves outside the download directory. Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.