CVE-2026-57583: @openzeppelin wizard · Code Injection
Affects @openzeppelin wizardSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 3.3 Low : upgrade to 0.10.11 when convenient.
Data as of 29 Oct 2026, 19:04 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 8% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.10.11, 3.0.1, 0.6.2 +1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 14 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| OpenZeppelincontracts-wizard | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| @openzeppelinwizard | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| @openzeppelinwizard-cairo | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| @openzeppelinwizard-stellar | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| @openzeppelinwizard-stylus | Affected
| Fixed in
|
AI-suggested
This vulnerability is fixed in OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizard versions 0.10.11, 3.0.1, 0.6.2, and 0.3.1 for the respective packages. Users should upgrade to these versions or later to remediate the issue. Since this is not a cloud service, remediation requires updating the affected packages. No additional mitigation is required if upgrading is performed.
Description
OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizard is a web application to interactively build a contract out of components from OpenZeppelin Contracts. Prior to @openzeppelin/wizard 0.10.11, @openzeppelin/wizard-cairo 3.0.1, @openzeppelin/wizard-stellar 0.6.2, and @openzeppelin/wizard-stylus 0.3.1, the setInfo code path prints info.securityContact and info.license verbatim into single-line comments in generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus source. A line terminator ends the comment and causes following input to be emitted as source declarations. Exploitation requires an integration to populate these fields from untrusted input and a user to consume the generated source; normal self-service web, AI assistant, CLI, and self-hosted API use does not cross that trust boundary, shared links cannot set the fields, and no code executes on a Wizard service. This issue affects generated-source integrity only and is fixed in versions 0.10.11, 3.0.1, 0.6.2, and 0.3.1 of the respective packages.
References
- github.com/OpenZeppelin/contracts-wizard/security/advisories/GHSA-9wxg-vf3r-56hc (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/OpenZeppelin/contracts-wizard/pull/818 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/OpenZeppelin/contracts-wizard/commit/6b18ecbd727a22d9f8c592e5d56caa2e977fb225 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/OpenZeppelin/contracts-wizard/releases/tag/@openzeppelin/wizard-cairo@3.0.1 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/OpenZeppelin/contracts-wizard/releases/tag/@openzeppelin/wizard-stellar@0.6.2 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/OpenZeppelin/contracts-wizard/releases/tag/@openzeppelin/wizard-stylus@0.3.1 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/OpenZeppelin/contracts-wizard/releases/tag/@openzeppelin/wizard@0.10.11 (opens in a new tab)