CVE-2026-5809: wpForo Forum (WordPress plugin) · External Control of File Name or Path
Affects wpForo Forum (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.1 High.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 42% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 11 Apr 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| tomdeverwpForo Forum | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Until an official fix is released, restrict user roles and permissions to trusted users only, and consider disabling or limiting access to the wpForo Forum plugin's topic editing features for lower-privileged users. Monitor for updates from the vendor and apply patches promptly when available.
Description
The wpForo Forum plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to and including 3.0.2. This is due to a two-step logic flaw: the topic_add() and topic_edit() action handlers accept arbitrary user-supplied data[*] arrays from $_REQUEST and store them as postmeta without restricting which fields may contain array values. Because 'body' is included in the allowed topic fields list, an attacker can supply data[body][fileurl] with an arbitrary file path (e.g., wp-config.php or an absolute server path). This poisoned fileurl is persisted to the plugin's custom postmeta database table. Subsequently, when the attacker submits wpftcf_delete[]=body on a topic_edit request, the add_file() method retrieves the stored postmeta record, extracts the attacker-controlled fileurl, passes it through wpforo_fix_upload_dir() which only rewrites legitimate wpforo upload paths and returns all other paths unchanged, and then calls wp_delete_file() on the unvalidated path. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files writable by the PHP process on the server, including critical files such as wp-config.
References
- wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/0e46ac8d-89ee-4480-bb96-83f2044a4323?source=cve (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3503313/wpforo (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/Actions.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/Actions.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/Posts.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/PostMeta.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/PostMeta.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/PostMeta.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/includes/functions.php (opens in a new tab)