Skip to main content
VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-58198: gunthercox ChatterBot · Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

Affects gunthercox ChatterBotSource CVE Database V5

0
Compare

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.5 Medium : upgrade to 1.2.14 when convenient.

Data as of 21 Nov 2026, 17:35 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.5Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 3% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.2.14
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 9 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 21 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade ChatterBot and chatterbot to 1.2.14.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
gunthercoxChatterBotAffected
  • <1.2.14
Fixed in
  • 1.2.14
PyPIchatterbotpkg:pypi/chatterbotOther threatsAffected
  • <1.2.14
Fixed in
  • 1.2.14

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Upgrade ChatterBot to version 1.2.14 or later, where this TOCTOU race condition vulnerability is fixed. Until upgraded, avoid running the vulnerable extract function in environments where local attackers can create symlinks at the predictable extraction path.

Description

ChatterBot is a machine learning, conversational dialog engine for creating chat bots. Prior to 1.2.14, UbuntuCorpusTrainer.extract() uses a predictable home-rooted output directory (~/ubuntu_data/ubuntu_dialogs) with a check-then-create pattern followed by tar.extractall(path=self.data_path), allowing a local attacker who pre-plants a symlink at the predictable path to cause archive contents to be written through the symlink to an attacker-chosen directory. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.14.

References

Community reviews

Loading reviews…