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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-58457: Shenzhen Aitemi E Commerce M300 Wi-Fi Repeater · OS Command Injection

Affects Shenzhen Aitemi E Commerce M300 Wi-Fi RepeaterSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.3 Critical.

Data as of 13 Nov 2026, 23:54 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
9.3Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
2.9% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 87% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 1 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: evidence found.

    Public exploit code: GitHub proofs of concept

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), GitHub proofs of concept, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Shenzhen Aitemi E Commerce Co. Ltd.M300 Wi-Fi RepeaterAffected
  • *
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

Until an official fix is available, restrict network access to the device's management interface to trusted users only and monitor for suspicious activity. Avoid exposing the device's web backend to untrusted networks.

Description

Shenzhen Aitemi M300 Wi-Fi Repeater (hardware model MT02) contains an unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability that allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands by injecting unsanitized input through the smacfilter_conf handler in the commuos web backend. Attackers can append semicolon-delimited payloads to the name, enable, or mac GET parameters, which are passed without sanitization into sprintf() to build uci shell commands executed via doSystemCmdComlib(), granting full root-level control of the device.

References

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