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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-63920: Linux kernel · Out-of-bounds Read

Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.1 High · fixed in eb18a1b1644e4cad978df2131e2bb9a2e6886992 : patch Linux kernel soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.1High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 6% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CISA SSVC
Exploitation
No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
Automatable
Attackers cannot reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
Technical impact
Limited control over the software or limited information exposure

CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-10-16.

Patch
Available – fixed in eb18a1b1644e4cad978df2131e2bb9a2e6886992, dd433671fef381fdaf7b530c631e6b782d66e224, a29768d56eb3798c052ad3281b05596e695a17af +5
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 19 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < eb18a1b1644e4cad978df2131e2bb9a2e6886992
Fixed in
  • eb18a1b1644e4cad978df2131e2bb9a2e6886992
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < dd433671fef381fdaf7b530c631e6b782d66e224
Fixed in
  • dd433671fef381fdaf7b530c631e6b782d66e224
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < a29768d56eb3798c052ad3281b05596e695a17af
Fixed in
  • a29768d56eb3798c052ad3281b05596e695a17af
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < a35daeabb433686234b010ebf7b53778dbd6c9b8
Fixed in
  • a35daeabb433686234b010ebf7b53778dbd6c9b8
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < 81394827dfb72772c50d0ae3bdfa094428a5d76d
Fixed in
  • 81394827dfb72772c50d0ae3bdfa094428a5d76d
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < 08464413e628803bd10cb1df68d0138665f2f885
Fixed in
  • 08464413e628803bd10cb1df68d0138665f2f885

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR} cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length. The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(), etc.). An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040 bytes from an 8-byte header. nftables is reachable from an unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged slab-out-of-bounds read: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 udpv6_recvmsg+0xca0/0x1250 sock_recvmsg+0xdf/0x190 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1b1/0x620 Add ipv6_get_exthdr_len() which validates that at least two bytes are accessible before reading the hdrlen field, then checks the computed length against skb_tail_pointer(skb), returning 0 on failure. Extension headers are kept in the linear skb area by pskb_may_pull() during input, so skb_tail_pointer() is the correct bound. Use ipv6_get_exthdr_len() at all non-AH call sites: the five standalone cmsg blocks (HbH, 2292HbH, 2292DSTOPTS x2, 2292RTHDR) and the three standard cases in the extension-header walk loop (DSTOPTS, ROUTING, default). AH retains an inline bounds check because its length formula differs ((ptr[1]+2)<<2). The walk loop also gets a pre-read bounds check at the top to validate ptr before any case accesses ptr[0] or ptr[1]. When the walk loop detects a corrupted header, return from the function instead of continuing to process later socket options.

References

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