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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-64132: Linux kernel · ipv6: ioam: refresh hdr pointer before ioam6_event()

Source GCVE Database

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.8 Critical.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 12:55 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.8Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 41% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 19 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

AI-suggested

A fix has been applied to the Linux kernel to recalculate the hdr pointer after skb_ensure_writable() to prevent use-after-free. Users should update their Linux kernel to a version that includes this patch once available.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: ioam: refresh hdr pointer before ioam6_event() Reported by Sashiko: In ipv6_hop_ioam(), the hdr pointer is initialized to point into the skb's linear data buffer. Later, the code calls skb_ensure_writable(), which might reallocate the buffer: if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, optoff + 2 + hdr->opt_len)) goto drop; /* Trace pointer may have changed */ trace = (struct ioam6_trace_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + optoff + sizeof(*hdr)); ioam6_fill_trace_data(skb, ns, trace, true); ioam6_event(IOAM6_EVENT_TRACE, dev_net(skb->dev), GFP_ATOMIC, (void *)trace, hdr->opt_len - 2); If the skb is cloned or lacks sufficient linear headroom, skb_ensure_writable() will invoke pskb_expand_head(), which reallocates the skb's data buffer and frees the old one, invalidating pointers to it. While the code recalculates the trace pointer immediately after the call to skb_ensure_writable(), it fails to recalculate the hdr pointer. This patch fixes the above by recalculating the hdr pointer before passing hdr->opt_len to ioam6_event(), so that we avoid any UaF.

References

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