CVE-2026-64274: Linux kernel · Input: goodix – clamp the device-reported contact count
Source GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.8 High.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 6% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 25 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
AI-suggested
A fix is available and has been applied by clamping the maximum reported touch count to the buffer size. Users should update their Linux kernel to a version that includes this fix. Since this is a kernel-level vulnerability, applying the official kernel patch or upgrading to a fixed kernel release is the recommended mitigation.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported by the device into an on-stack buffer u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS]; which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num, but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device configuration block and is never clamped: ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f; The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes ts->contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the 92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write. Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration.
References
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64274 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a67668690129953e898923260a2dd1c7c196495 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b32303460155603d25444274856013d211d5e1f (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/46addbd13dbf4aacb71cfbca964a5e552d0f45ae (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/4bfea9c3a0981c1c7fc5d1a1b27197b2de247902 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ed62a96e06be4e94b8296b7932afee550a70e04 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/719d1a2c83a46be6bf81af905e4f6adb3d32dc28 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/98b2caef249183b572c04451365246f919707845 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/e825f352ef5271255cd08cc994b0dc25648a2f38 (opens in a new tab)