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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-64320: Linux kernel · Out-of-bounds Read

Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical · fixed in a29b316b9bbfd269f323ab4ba9906a894025680f : patch Linux kernel as a priority.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 13:47 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.1Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 54% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CISA SSVC
Exploitation
No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
Automatable
Attackers can reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
Technical impact
Limited control over the software or limited information exposure

CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-10-16.

Patch
Available – fixed in a29b316b9bbfd269f323ab4ba9906a894025680f, 56c021a0869260d04c4b65d1471936aaf9177114, 53cd102a7a56079b11b897835bd9b94c14e6322c +2
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 25 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ a07b4970f464f13640e28e16dad6cfa33647cc99, < a29b316b9bbfd269f323ab4ba9906a894025680f
Fixed in
  • a29b316b9bbfd269f323ab4ba9906a894025680f
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ a07b4970f464f13640e28e16dad6cfa33647cc99, < 56c021a0869260d04c4b65d1471936aaf9177114
Fixed in
  • 56c021a0869260d04c4b65d1471936aaf9177114
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ a07b4970f464f13640e28e16dad6cfa33647cc99, < 53cd102a7a56079b11b897835bd9b94c14e6322c
Fixed in
  • 53cd102a7a56079b11b897835bd9b94c14e6322c
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ a07b4970f464f13640e28e16dad6cfa33647cc99, < 33b974eb626154ae9348f2bac7de84cb2a3d9dd4
Fixed in
  • 33b974eb626154ae9348f2bac7de84cb2a3d9dd4
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ a07b4970f464f13640e28e16dad6cfa33647cc99, < 8ae9bb92fc9a712a8d32da9c5fd657101f9b260b
Fixed in
  • 8ae9bb92fc9a712a8d32da9c5fd657101f9b260b
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • =4.8
Fixed in–

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound check: u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); /* 64-bit host */ size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); /* 32-bit host */ ... if (offset & 0x3) { ... } /* only check */ ... alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req); buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL); ... status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len); The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed() returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81 canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead. The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern "nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local destination offset with a fixed source pointer. Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns() (admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the host asks for more bytes than the log page contains.

References

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