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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-64487: Linux kernel · ALSA: caiaq: fix out-of-bounds read in the Traktor Kontrol S4 input parser

Source GCVE Database

0

Not known to be exploited.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC

Severity
Medium

Rated by Threat Radar · No CVSS score from NVD or the CNA

EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 7% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 25 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

AI-suggested

A fix has been implemented in the Linux kernel to address this issue by modifying the input parser to process only complete 16-byte message blocks, preventing the out-of-bounds read. Users should apply the official Linux kernel updates that include this patch. Since this is a kernel-level vulnerability, updating the kernel to a fixed version is the recommended remediation. Patch status is not explicitly stated in the provided data; users should consult the vendor or Linux kernel advisory for the exact fixed versions and update accordingly.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: caiaq: fix out-of-bounds read in the Traktor Kontrol S4 input parser snd_usb_caiaq_tks4_dispatch() decodes the Traktor Kontrol S4 input stream in fixed 16-byte (TKS4_MSGBLOCK_SIZE) message blocks. On every iteration it advances buf and subtracts the block size while looping on "while (len)". len is urb->actual_length. That value is supplied by the device and is not guaranteed to be a multiple of 16. When a final short block leaves len between 1 and 15, the loop runs once more, reads up to buf[15], and then does "len -= TKS4_MSGBLOCK_SIZE". As len is unsigned this underflows to a huge value. The loop then keeps iterating and walking buf far past the end of the 512-byte ep4_in_buf, reading out of bounds until a bogus block id happens to be hit. Iterate only while a full message block is available. This stops the unsigned underflow and silently drops any trailing partial block, which carries no complete control value anyway. The sibling endpoint-4 parsers are not affected. The Traktor Kontrol X1 and Maschine arms in snd_usb_caiaq_ep4_reply_dispatch() floor urb->actual_length before dispatching.

References

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