CVE-2026-65065: CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource in EGOR Data::RoaringBitmap::Shared
Data::RoaringBitmap::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in roaring.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The vulnerability in Data::RoaringBitmap::Shared (CVE-2026-65065) arises from incorrect permission assignment and unsafe file opening practices. Specifically, the mmap backing file is created with mode 0666, which after applying the default umask 022 results in a world-readable file (mode 0644). The open call does not use O_EXCL, allowing it to open an existing file silently, and lacks O_NOFOLLOW, enabling symlink traversal. Since the shared segment resides in a shared directory accessible by local users, this permits local attackers to read IPC payloads or exploit pre-creation race conditions by planting files or symlinks at the target path.
Potential Impact
Local users can read sensitive inter-process communication (IPC) data stored in the world-readable mmap backing file. They can also exploit the absence of O_EXCL and O_NOFOLLOW flags to perform pre-creation race attacks or redirect file operations via symlinks, potentially leading to unauthorized data disclosure or manipulation of the shared resource.
Mitigation Recommendations
Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Until a fix is available, avoid running Data::RoaringBitmap::Shared in environments where untrusted local users have access to the shared directory paths used for the mmap backing file. Monitor vendor communications for patches that address file permission settings and the use of safe open flags (O_EXCL and O_NOFOLLOW).
CVE-2026-65065: CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource in EGOR Data::RoaringBitmap::Shared
Description
Data::RoaringBitmap::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in roaring.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open.
Affected software
pkg:github/Data-RoaringBitmap-SharedRun on your own infrastructure? Check whether these packages are installed with threat-finder — our free open-source scanner.
AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The vulnerability in Data::RoaringBitmap::Shared (CVE-2026-65065) arises from incorrect permission assignment and unsafe file opening practices. Specifically, the mmap backing file is created with mode 0666, which after applying the default umask 022 results in a world-readable file (mode 0644). The open call does not use O_EXCL, allowing it to open an existing file silently, and lacks O_NOFOLLOW, enabling symlink traversal. Since the shared segment resides in a shared directory accessible by local users, this permits local attackers to read IPC payloads or exploit pre-creation race conditions by planting files or symlinks at the target path.
Potential Impact
Local users can read sensitive inter-process communication (IPC) data stored in the world-readable mmap backing file. They can also exploit the absence of O_EXCL and O_NOFOLLOW flags to perform pre-creation race attacks or redirect file operations via symlinks, potentially leading to unauthorized data disclosure or manipulation of the shared resource.
Mitigation Recommendations
Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Until a fix is available, avoid running Data::RoaringBitmap::Shared in environments where untrusted local users have access to the shared directory paths used for the mmap backing file. Monitor vendor communications for patches that address file permission settings and the use of safe open flags (O_EXCL and O_NOFOLLOW).
Technical Details
- Data Version
- 5.2
- Assigner Short Name
- CPANSec
- Date Reserved
- 2026-07-21T15:29:37.116Z
- Cvss Version
- null
- State
- PUBLISHED
- Remediation Level
- null
Threat ID: 6a5fcbb72a4a8d5989ac73b8
Added to database: 07/21/2026, 19:42:47 UTC
Last enriched: 07/21/2026, 19:51:58 UTC
Last updated: 07/21/2026, 21:03:13 UTC
Views: 5
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