VulnerabilityPublished 4 Aug 2026

CVE-2026-66883: Erlang Ecosystem Foundation oidcc_plug · Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity

Affects Erlang Ecosystem Foundation oidcc_plugSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.3 Medium : upgrade to 0.5.0 when convenient.

Data as of 2 Nov 2026, 22:58 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score

6.3Medium

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 30% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 0.5.0, f15e52c5750aaba701104b10ed96cfac063bd557

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: High
Attack Requirements: Present
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Vulnerable system confidentiality: None
Vulnerable system integrity: Low
Vulnerable system availability: None
Subsequent system confidentiality: None
Subsequent system integrity: None
Subsequent system availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: High: The successful attack depends on the evasion or circumvention of security-enhancing techniques in place that would otherwise hinder the attack. These include: Evasion of exploit mitigation techniques, for example, circumvention of address space randomization (ASLR) or data execution prevention (DEP) must be performed for the attack to be successful; Obtaining target-specific secrets. The attacker must gather some target-specific secret before the attack can be successful. A secret is any piece of information that cannot be obtained through any amount of reconnaissance. To obtain the secret the attacker must perform additional attacks or break otherwise secure measures (e.g. knowledge of a secret key may be needed to break a crypto channel). This operation must be performed for each attacked target.
Attack Requirements: Present: The successful attack depends on the presence of specific deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These include: a race condition must be won to successfully exploit the vulnerability (the successfulness of the attack is conditioned on execution conditions that are not under full control of the attacker, or the attack may need to be launched multiple times against a single target before being successful); the attacker must inject themselves into the logical network path between the target and the resource requested by the victim (e.g. vulnerabilities requiring an on-path attacker).
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker.
Vulnerable system confidentiality: None: There is no loss of confidentiality within the Vulnerable System.
Vulnerable system integrity: Low: Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of modification is limited. The data modification does not have a direct, serious impact to the Vulnerable System.
Vulnerable system availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system confidentiality: None: There is no loss of confidentiality within the Subsequent System or all confidentiality impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the Subsequent System or all integrity impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the Subsequent System or all availability impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v4.0 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 4 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2 Nov 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponized: A Metasploit exploit module or Exploit-DB entry exists (Metasploit scanner modules do not count), or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade oidcc_plug to 0.5.0; oidcc_plug to f15e52c5750aaba701104b10ed96cfac063bd557.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Erlang Ecosystem Foundationoidcc_plug	Affected >=0.1.0-alpha.3 <0.5.0	Fixed in 0.5.0
Erlang Ecosystem Foundationoidcc_plug	Affected ≥ 0a75fb139d8e2686d1b75e0d48962323d2181673, < f15e52c5750aaba701104b10ed96cfac063bd557	Fixed in f15e52c5750aaba701104b10ed96cfac063bd557
Hexoidcc_plug`pkg:hex/oidcc_plug`Other threats	Affected >=0.1.0-alpha.3 <0.5.0	Fixed in 0.5.0

CPE configurations (1)

cpe:2.3:a:erlef:oidcc_plug:*:*:*:*:*:erlang:*:*

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AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, deployments should be aware that enabling check_useragent does not provide the intended protection. No additional mitigation steps are indicated by the vendor advisory.

Description

Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity vulnerability in Erlang Ecosystem Foundation oidcc_plug (Oidcc.Plug.Authorize module) renders the user agent session binding inert, removing a defense in depth control against replay of a stolen session. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/oidcc/plug/authorize.ex and lib/oidcc/plug/authorization_callback.ex, and program routines Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 and Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback.call/2. Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 reads the initiating client's user agent with get_req_header(conn, "User-Agent"). Plug lowercases incoming header names, but get_req_header/2 matches the supplied key exactly and performs no normalization of its own, so the mixed-case lookup always returns an empty list and nil is written into the session. On the callback side, Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback treats a stored nil user agent as nothing to compare and returns :ok without inspecting the request. The two behaviours combine so that the check passes unconditionally on every request, including for deployments that explicitly opted in with check_useragent: true, and an authorization callback can be completed from a different user agent than the one that initiated the flow without detection. The check fails open silently, with no error and no log entry, so a deployment cannot tell the binding is absent. The impact is limited to defense in depth. The inert check does not by itself allow an attacker to complete an authorization flow; it removes one layer that would otherwise hinder use of a stolen or leaked session, such as an exfiltrated session cookie replayed from a different client. The CSRF/state, nonce, and PKCE checks are unaffected and continue to function. Deployments that never enabled check_useragent are not affected in practice, since they never expected the binding. The corresponding lookup in Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback correctly uses the lowercase key and is not affected. This issue affects oidcc_plug: from 0.1.0-alpha.3 before 0.5.0.

Impact

The vulnerability removes a defense-in-depth control designed to bind a user session to the initiating user agent, allowing replay of stolen or leaked sessions from different user agents without detection. However, it does not enable attackers to complete authorization flows by itself because other protections remain intact. Deployments not using the check_useragent option are not affected in practice. There are no known exploits in the wild.

Summary

The vulnerability arises because oidcc_plug's Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 function reads the user agent header using get_req_header(conn, "User-Agent"), but Plug lowercases header names while get_req_header/2 requires exact case matching. This mismatch causes the user agent lookup to always return nil, which is stored in the session. Later, Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback.call/2 treats a nil user agent as no value to compare and returns success without verification. Consequently, the user agent binding check intended to prevent session replay attacks is effectively disabled without any error or log indication. This affects oidcc_plug versions from 0.1.0-alpha.3 up to but not including 0.5.0. The vulnerability only impacts deployments that enabled the check_useragent feature and does not compromise other security checks like CSRF, nonce, or PKCE.

CWE-178Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity (opens in a new tab)
Base weakness
The product does not properly account for differences in case sensitivity when accessing or determining the properties of a resource, leading to inconsistent results.
Architecture and Design · Input Validation
Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those resources can have alternate names.
Implementation · Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
Implementation · Input Validation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174).
From MITRE CWE, MITRE CAPEC and OWASP (Top 10, OpenCRE).

References

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Exploitation evidence

What to do

Affected software

CPE configurations (1)

Description

AI analysisMachine-generated, updated 4 Aug 2026, 12:24 UTC

WeaknessesCWE-178

Technical details

References

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