CVE-2026-68082: Linux kernel · libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()
Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.8 Critical · fixed in c8ade01170a27d8ede0d761c255268af81e417f8 : patch Linux kernel as a priority.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:18 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 42% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- CISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
- Automatable
- Attackers can reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
- Technical impact
- Total control over the software or total information disclosure
CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-10-16.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in c8ade01170a27d8ede0d761c255268af81e417f8, a109a556115271ca7896dcda7b4b7e45e156c227, a54be593d0b749161b08a1e56189b2cb9114267a +5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 8 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers() decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads: 1. ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads 4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count. The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant. 2. ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct influence over the lock type field. Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers, err_inval) ceph_decode_8(p) -> ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type, err_free_lockers) The goto targets differ intentionally: err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers(). err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must be freed. ret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that err_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation. Without this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from the successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error. -EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the OSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure class to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition). [ idryomov: trim changelog, formatting ]
References
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8ade01170a27d8ede0d761c255268af81e417f8 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/001835c599899ef1bd3506a815110a6374451554 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c422364acd93d7da1dfc27d6b54635a269653a1 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/02430f6f729b297e803d0605871f0a670b4eafd6 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/57ba829804fe6d34bbac3b826c4b15c1caa54862 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/89df5d71f83f8e2781286798fd8ae5e42cf5f1a7 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/a54be593d0b749161b08a1e56189b2cb9114267a (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/a109a556115271ca7896dcda7b4b7e45e156c227 (opens in a new tab)