VulnerabilityPublished 10 Aug 2026Updated 9 Oct 2026

CVE-2026-68095: Linux kernel · fuse-uring: fix race between registration and connection abortion

Affects Linux kernelSource GCVE Database

Not known to be exploited · fixed in 7.0.0-38.38~24.04.4 : update Linux kernel when convenient.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

Severity

Medium

Rated by Threat Radar · CVSS not yet scored by NVD

EPSS: 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 5% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 7.0.0-38.38~24.04.4, 7.0.0-38.38, 7.0.0-1014.14 +11

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 10 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponised: Public exploit code exists in Metasploit or Exploit-DB, or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux`pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux?arch=source&distro=resolute`Other threats	Affected <7.0.0-38.38	Fixed in 7.0.0-38.38
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-aws`pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-aws?arch=source&distro=resolute`Other threats	Affected <7.0.0-1014.14	Fixed in 7.0.0-1014.14
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-azure`pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-azure?arch=source&distro=resolute`Other threats	Affected <7.0.0-1017.17	Fixed in 7.0.0-1017.17
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-azure-fde`pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-azure-fde?arch=source&distro=resolute`Other threats	Affected <7.0.0-1016.16	Fixed in 7.0.0-1016.16
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-gcp`pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-gcp?arch=source&distro=resolute`Other threats	Affected <7.0.0-1014.14	Fixed in 7.0.0-1014.14
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-gke`pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-gke?arch=source&distro=resolute`Other threats	Affected <7.0.0-1008.9	Fixed in 7.0.0-1008.9

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse-uring: fix race between registration and connection abortion This fixes this race: - thread a: io_uring_enter -> register sqe -> fuse_uring_create_ring_ent -> allocate ent but doesn't grab queue_ref yet - thread b: fuse_conn_destroy() -> fuse_chan_abort() -> fuse_uring_abort() is a no-op due to queue ref being 0 - thread a: grabs the queue_ref, queue_ref is now 1, rest of fuse_uring_do_register() logic executes - thread b: fuse_chan_abort() returns, fuse_chan_wait_aborted() now runs and calls "wait_event(ring->stop_waitq, atomic_read(&ring->queue_refs) == 0);" The abort/unmount thread will hang indefinitely in unkillable state as nothing will decrement queue_refs or wake stop_waitq, and the ring, queue, and ent are leaked. Fix this by checking fch->connected under fch->lock after the created ent has grabbed a ref count on the queue. This ensures that in the scenario above, it is guaranteed that we either release the queue ref and wake up stop_waitq (in case fuse_chan_wait_aborted() is already waiting) in fuse_uring_do_register() when we detect !fch->connected, or if the connection is aborted after the check, it is guaranteed that the async teardown worker will be running in the background cleaning up ents and decrementing the ent's ref on the queue, which will unblock the eventual queue and ring teardown.

References

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