CVE-2026-68160: Linux kernel · Out-of-bounds Read
Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.8 Critical · fixed in f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc : patch Linux kernel as a priority.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 55% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- CISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
- Automatable
- Attackers can reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
- Technical impact
- Total control over the software or total information disclosure
CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-10-16.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc, cc93f68a31c9b831abf2db8647b5f5b10329d793, a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb +5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 10 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
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Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case: snaptrace = h + 1; snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len); p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len; ... case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT: if (snaptrace_len) { ... if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace, snaptrace + snaptrace_len, false, &realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps / ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced. Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room() helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p, guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit path.
References
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c011137194036424e974677e0f1592e22a33d8c (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc93f68a31c9b831abf2db8647b5f5b10329d793 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02 (opens in a new tab)