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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-72084: Linux kernel · Out-of-bounds Read

Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.8 Critical · fixed in d04a179085c262c9ed577d0a4cbc6482ff1fd9a3 : patch Linux kernel as a priority.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.8Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 54% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CISA SSVC
Exploitation
No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
Automatable
Attackers can reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
Technical impact
Total control over the software or total information disclosure

CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-10-16.

Patch
Available – fixed in d04a179085c262c9ed577d0a4cbc6482ff1fd9a3, 842248047ef28dbf3b3f7f49a0ec315054d4dab8, 9298078a8f7d8181a04614a34ab655ccdf038204 +5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 15 Aug 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, < d04a179085c262c9ed577d0a4cbc6482ff1fd9a3
Fixed in
  • d04a179085c262c9ed577d0a4cbc6482ff1fd9a3
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, < 842248047ef28dbf3b3f7f49a0ec315054d4dab8
Fixed in
  • 842248047ef28dbf3b3f7f49a0ec315054d4dab8
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, < 9298078a8f7d8181a04614a34ab655ccdf038204
Fixed in
  • 9298078a8f7d8181a04614a34ab655ccdf038204
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, < 555a89846ed888d7401b3f7200934c0fbedcbb46
Fixed in
  • 555a89846ed888d7401b3f7200934c0fbedcbb46
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, < 88c67c3de914e19172e1d878a7625c5b06c20ec5
Fixed in
  • 88c67c3de914e19172e1d878a7625c5b06c20ec5
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, < 6ca5de8782e67573a61a6736b6dc0ffe58dcdf59
Fixed in
  • 6ca5de8782e67573a61a6736b6dc0ffe58dcdf59

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: Bound PR-OUT TransportID parsing to the received buffer core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port() and core_scsi3_emulate_register_and_move() hand the raw PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT parameter buffer to target_parse_pr_out_transport_id() without telling it how many bytes are valid. For an iSCSI TransportID (FORMAT CODE 01b), iscsi_parse_pr_out_transport_id() locates the ",i,0x" ISID separator with an unbounded strstr() (and on the error path prints the name with a further unbounded "%s"). An initiator can submit a TransportID whose iSCSI name contains neither a ",i,0x" substring nor a NUL terminator, filling the parameter list to its end, so the scan runs off the end of the buffer. When the parameter list spans more than one page the buffer is a multi-page vmap (transport_kmap_data_sg()), so the over-read walks into the trailing vmalloc guard page and oopses (KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in strstr). It is reachable by any fabric that delivers a PR OUT to a device exported through an iSCSI TPG, including a guest via vhost-scsi. Pass the number of received bytes down to the parser and validate the iSCSI TransportID's own self-described length (ADDITIONAL LENGTH + 4) once, up front: reject it if it is below the spc4r17 minimum or larger than the received buffer, then bound the separator search, the ISID walk and the name copy by that length. This is the length check the callers already perform after the parse (core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port() compares tid_len against tpdl, core_scsi3_emulate_register_and_move() validates it against data_length), moved ahead of the scan. Also drop the unbounded "%s" of the unterminated name. Add per-format explicit name-length checks before copying into i_str, rather than silently truncating with min_t: for FORMAT CODE 00b reject if the descriptor body (tid_len - 4 bytes) cannot fit in i_str[TRANSPORT_IQN_LEN]; for FORMAT CODE 01b reject if the name portion (from &buf[4] up to the separator) cannot fit. Both checks make the bounds intent explicit at each format branch. While here, also reject a FORMAT CODE 01b TransportID whose ",i,0x" separator sits at the very end of the descriptor: that leaves an empty ISID and points the returned port nexus pointer at buf + tid_len, one past the descriptor, which the registration code (__core_scsi3_locate_pr_reg(), __core_scsi3_alloc_registration()) then dereferences as the ISID string -- the same over-read of the parameter buffer for a malformed descriptor.

References

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