VulnerabilityPublished 12 Aug 2026Updated 14 Aug 2026

CVE-2026-72793: siyuan · Insufficiently Protected Credentials

Affects siyuanSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.2 Critical : upgrade to 3.7.4 as a priority.

Data as of 9 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score

9.2Critical

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 23% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 3.7.4

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Attack Requirements: None
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Vulnerable system confidentiality: High
Vulnerable system integrity: None
Vulnerable system availability: None
Subsequent system confidentiality: High
Subsequent system integrity: None
Subsequent system availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: None: The successful attack does not depend on the deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system. The attacker can expect to be able to reach the vulnerability and execute the exploit under all or most instances of the vulnerability.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker.
Vulnerable system confidentiality: High: There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all information within the Vulnerable System being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Vulnerable system integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the Vulnerable System.
Vulnerable system availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system confidentiality: High: There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the Subsequent System being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Subsequent system integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the Subsequent System or all integrity impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the Subsequent System or all availability impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v4.0 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 12 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 10 Nov 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponized: A Metasploit exploit module or Exploit-DB entry exists (Metasploit scanner modules do not count), or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade siyuan and siyuan-note/siyuan to 3.7.4.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
siyuan-notesiyuan	Affected <3.7.4	Fixed in 3.7.4
GitHubsiyuan-note/siyuan`pkg:github/siyuan-note/siyuan`Other threats	Affected <3.7.4	Fixed in 3.7.4

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, restrict access to the /api/system/getConf endpoint and configure access-auth codes to prevent unauthorized privilege escalation.

Description

**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72793](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72793). ### Summary `/api/system/getConf` is registered with `CheckAuth` only and is reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token, and anonymously when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. Its non-administrator masking chain is a blocklist that enumerates fields individually. Three fields that the configuration-export endpoint in the same file deliberately clears are absent from that blocklist and are returned to readers: | Field | JSON | What it is | Cleared by `exportConf` at | |---|---|---|---| | `Conf.CookieKey` | `cookieKey` | The session-cookie signing key | `kernel/api/system.go:360` | | `Conf.Export.PandocBin` | `export.pandocBin` | Absolute path embedding the OS username | `kernel/api/system.go:338` | | `Conf.NotebookCrypto` | `notebookCrypto` | Encrypted-notebook key material | `kernel/api/system.go:360` | The project has already classified all three as values that must not leave the server. The reader-facing path returns them. ### Details **Route.** `kernel/api/router.go:70` : `POST /api/system/getConf` → `model.CheckAuth` → `getConf`. No `CheckReadonly`, no `CheckAdminRole`. **The masking chain, and what each stage covers.** `getConf` masks through `GetMaskedConf()` → `HideConfSecret()` (non-administrators) → `FilterConfByPublishIgnore()` (readers) → a browser-request path strip. - `GetMaskedConf`: `UserData`, `MCPOAuth`, `AccessAuthCode`. - `HideConfSecret`: `AI`, `Api`, `Flashcard`, `ServerAddrs`, `Publish`, `Repo`, `Sync`, `Secrets`, `Variables`, and the System paths. No reference to `CookieKey` or `Export.PandocBin`. - `FilterConfByPublishIgnore`: `UILayout` only. - Browser strip (`kernel/api/system.go:630-631`): System paths only. Each stage names fields explicitly, so any field nobody thought to add is returned by default. --- **1. `CookieKey`: the live session-signing key.** The value is passed straight into the session store at startup: ``` cli/cmd/serve.go:67 go server.Serve(false, model.Conf.CookieKey) kernel/server/serve.go:152 sessionStore = cookie.NewStore([]byte(cookieKey)) kernel/server/serve.go:159 ginServer.Use(sessions.Sessions("siyuan", sessionStore)) ``` `gin-contrib/sessions/cookie.NewStore` constructed with a single key uses that key as the `gorilla/securecookie` HMAC key. The `siyuan` session cookie is signed with the value this endpoint hands out, so an attacker holding it can mint and modify session cookies the server accepts as authentic. Escalating a forged session to administrator additionally requires the forged `SessionData` to carry the matching `AccessAuthCode` which *is* masked or the instance to have no access-auth code configured, which is a common deployment. The unconditional impact, present on every instance, is disclosure of a persistent cryptographic secret to an unauthenticated party. Rotating it invalidates every active session, so it cannot be quietly refreshed. --- **2. `Export.PandocBin`: bypasses a shipped privacy control.** The field is an absolute path that embeds the OS username by construction: ``` conf/export.go:35 PandocBin string `json:"pandocBin"` model/conf.go:430-431 if "" == Conf.Export.PandocBin { Conf.Export.PandocBin = util.PandocBinPath } util/pandoc.go:154 PandocBinPath = filepath.Join(tempPandocDir, "bin", "pandoc.exe") util/pandoc.go:134 tempPandocDir = filepath.Join(TempDir, "pandoc") util/working.go:359 TempDir = filepath.Join(WorkspaceDir, "temp") util/working.go:312 defaultWorkspaceDir = filepath.Join(userProfile, "SiYuan") ``` → `C:\Users\<username>\SiYuan\temp\pandoc\bin\pandoc.exe` This one is notable beyond the disclosure itself, because a control was shipped specifically to prevent it. `kernel/api/system.go:630` adds, for browser requests: ```go if util.IsBrowserRequest(c) { maskedConf.System.WorkspaceDir = "" maskedConf.System.AppDir = "" maskedConf.System.ConfDir = "" maskedConf.System.DataDir = "" maskedConf.System.HomeDir = "" } // 避免泄露用户名等敏感信息 ``` The comment states the goal plainly: avoid leaking the username and other sensitive information. The block enumerates only `System.*` and misses `Export.PandocBin`, which carries the same username through the same response. A publish reader is a browser request, so the System paths are blanked while `export.pandocBin` passes through intact. Where an administrator has configured a custom pandoc location, that path is disclosed instead still a filesystem-layout disclosure. --- **3. `NotebookCrypto`.** Encrypted-notebook key material is likewise absent from `HideConfSecret` while `exportConf` sets it to `nil`. Reported previously and included here only because it is the third instance of the same root cause; the fix below closes all three together. --- **The root cause is the blocklist itself.** `exportConf` (`kernel/api/system.go:299`) clones the configuration and clears each secret before

Impact

Attackers can obtain sensitive cryptographic keys and user information without authentication, enabling session cookie forgery and user impersonation. This can lead to unauthorized access and administrative privilege escalation on vulnerable SiYuan instances lacking access-auth codes.

Summary

CVE-2026-72793 affects SiYuan note-taking software versions prior to 3.7.4. The vulnerability arises because the /api/system/getConf endpoint does not mask sensitive configuration fields, allowing unauthorized users to retrieve critical secrets such as the session-cookie signing key, OS username via the pandoc path, and encrypted-notebook key material. With these secrets, attackers can forge and tamper with session cookies to impersonate legitimate users. On instances where access-auth codes are not configured, this can lead to privilege escalation to administrator level.

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Exploitation evidence

What to do

Affected software

Description

AI analysisMachine-generated, updated 12 Aug 2026, 19:56 UTC

Technical details

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