VulnerabilityPublished 12 Aug 2026Updated 14 Aug 2026

CVE-2026-72794: siyuan · Insufficiently Protected Credentials

Affects siyuanSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.2 Critical : upgrade to 3.7.4 as a priority.

Data as of 11 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score

9.2Critical

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 25% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 3.7.4

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Attack Requirements: None
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Vulnerable system confidentiality: High
Vulnerable system integrity: None
Vulnerable system availability: None
Subsequent system confidentiality: High
Subsequent system integrity: None
Subsequent system availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: None: The successful attack does not depend on the deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system. The attacker can expect to be able to reach the vulnerability and execute the exploit under all or most instances of the vulnerability.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker.
Vulnerable system confidentiality: High: There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all information within the Vulnerable System being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Vulnerable system integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the Vulnerable System.
Vulnerable system availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system confidentiality: High: There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the Subsequent System being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Subsequent system integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the Subsequent System or all integrity impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the Subsequent System or all availability impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v4.0 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 12 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 11 Nov 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponized: A Metasploit exploit module or Exploit-DB entry exists (Metasploit scanner modules do not count), or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade siyuan and siyuan-note/siyuan to 3.7.4.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
siyuan-notesiyuan	Affected <3.7.4	Fixed in 3.7.4
GitHubsiyuan-note/siyuan`pkg:github/siyuan-note/siyuan`Other threats	Affected <3.7.4	Fixed in 3.7.4

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AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, restrict access to the /api/system/getConf endpoint in publish mode or disable publish mode if possible to prevent exposure of the CookieKey.

Description

**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72794](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72794). ### Summary `/api/system/getConf` returns `Conf.CookieKey`, the key used to sign the server's session cookies in its response body. The endpoint is registered with `CheckAuth` only, so the field reaches the publish `RoleReader` token and the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. The configuration-export endpoint in the same file strips this exact field before returning config, so the project already treats it as secret. The reader-facing masking path does not. ### Details | Item | Detail | |---|---| | Route | `kernel/api/router.go:70` `POST /api/system/getConf` → `model.CheckAuth` → `getConf` | | Middleware | `CheckAuth` only — no `CheckReadonly`, no `CheckAdminRole` | | Leaked field | `AppConf.CookieKey`, serialized as `cookieKey` | | Purpose of the field | Signing key for the `siyuan` session cookie | **The field survives every stage of the masking chain.** `getConf` masks through `GetMaskedConf()` → `HideConfSecret()` (non-administrators) → `FilterConfByPublishIgnore()` (readers) → the browser-side System-path strip. `CookieKey` is removed by none of them: - `GetMaskedConf` masks `UserData`, `MCPOAuth` and `AccessAuthCode` only. - `HideConfSecret` nulls `AI`, `Api`, `Flashcard`, `ServerAddrs`, `Publish`, `Repo`, `Sync`, `Secrets`, `Variables` and the System paths. It contains no reference to `CookieKey`. - `FilterConfByPublishIgnore` touches `UILayout` only. - The browser-side strip removes System paths only. **The key is live, not vestigial.** It is passed straight into the session store at startup: ``` cli/cmd/serve.go:67 go server.Serve(false, model.Conf.CookieKey) kernel/server/serve.go:152 sessionStore = cookie.NewStore([]byte(cookieKey)) kernel/server/serve.go:159 ginServer.Use(sessions.Sessions("siyuan", sessionStore)) ``` `gin-contrib/sessions/cookie.NewStore` constructed with a single key uses that key as the `gorilla/securecookie` HMAC key. The `siyuan` session cookie is therefore signed with the value the endpoint hands out. An attacker holding it can mint and modify session cookies that the server accepts as authentic. **Guarded sibling, in the same file.** `exportConf` (`kernel/api/system.go:299`) clones the configuration before returning it and explicitly clears both secrets: ``` kernel/api/system.go:360 clonedConf.CookieKey = "" clonedConf.NotebookCrypto = nil ``` The project has already classified `CookieKey` as a value that must not leave the server. The `getConf` masking path omits the same field. **Ceiling is environment-dependent, floor is not.** Escalating a forged session to administrator additionally requires the forged `SessionData` to carry the matching `AccessAuthCode`, which `GetMaskedConf` does mask or the instance to have no access-auth code configured, which is a common deployment. The unconditional impact, present on every instance, is the disclosure of a persistent cryptographic secret to an unauthenticated party together with the cookie-forgery capability that follows from it. Rotating the key invalidates all existing sessions, so this is not a secret that can be quietly refreshed. ### Proof of Concept Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`, otherwise any publish reader account. ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/system/getConf {} → 200 The response body's conf object contains a cookieKey field holding the server's session-signing key in cleartext. ``` Differential check against the endpoint that does strip it: ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/system/exportConf → cookieKey is empty, notebookCrypto is null ``` The same value is withheld by one endpoint and returned by the other. ### Impact An anonymous reader in publish mode or any publish `RoleReader` obtains the server's session-cookie signing key. This is a persistent cryptographic secret whose disclosure cannot be remediated without invalidating every active session. Possession of the key permits forging and tampering with `siyuan` session cookies that the server will validate as authentic. On instances with no access-auth code configured, or where a forged session's contents otherwise satisfy the server's checks, this extends to authenticating as a privileged user. ### Suggested fix Clear `CookieKey` in `HideConfSecret` for all non-administrator responses. The more durable fix is to route non-administrator `getConf` through the `exportConf` cloner, which already handles `CookieKey`, `NotebookCrypto`, `Account`, `Stat`, `System.ID`, `Export.PandocBin` and the AI keys replacing the current blocklist, which fails open on every field nobody thought to add, with the allowlist-style cloner the project already maintains.

Impact

Attackers can retrieve the session cookie signing key without authentication and forge valid session cookies. This enables them to impersonate legitimate users or gain administrative access, compromising confidentiality and control over the affected system.

Summary

CVE-2026-72794 is a critical security vulnerability in siyuan-note software versions prior to v3.7.4. The flaw involves insufficient protection of credentials, specifically the session cookie signing key, which is exposed through the /api/system/getConf endpoint when the software is in publish mode. Because this endpoint is accessible without authentication, attackers can obtain the CookieKey value and use it to create forged session cookies. This can lead to unauthorized user impersonation or administrative privilege escalation. The vulnerability has a CVSS 4.0 score of 9.2, indicating a high severity with network attack vector, no required privileges or user interaction, and high impact on confidentiality and security capabilities.

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Affected software

Description

AI analysisMachine-generated, updated 12 Aug 2026, 19:44 UTC

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