VulnerabilityPublished 12 Aug 2026Updated 14 Aug 2026

CVE-2026-72802: siyuan · Insecure Direct Object Reference

Affects siyuanSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium : upgrade to 3.7.4 when convenient.

Data as of 9 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score

6.9Medium

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 22% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 3.7.4

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Attack Requirements: None
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Vulnerable system confidentiality: Low
Vulnerable system integrity: None
Vulnerable system availability: None
Subsequent system confidentiality: None
Subsequent system integrity: None
Subsequent system availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: None: The successful attack does not depend on the deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system. The attacker can expect to be able to reach the vulnerability and execute the exploit under all or most instances of the vulnerability.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker.
Vulnerable system confidentiality: Low: There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the Vulnerable System.
Vulnerable system integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the Vulnerable System.
Vulnerable system availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system confidentiality: None: There is no loss of confidentiality within the Subsequent System or all confidentiality impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the Subsequent System or all integrity impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the Subsequent System or all availability impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v4.0 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 12 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 9 Nov 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponized: A Metasploit exploit module or Exploit-DB entry exists (Metasploit scanner modules do not count), or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade siyuan to 3.7.4.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
siyuan-notesiyuan	Affected <3.7.4	Fixed in 3.7.4

AI-suggested

Users should upgrade to SiYuan version 3.7.4 or later once available, as the description indicates the vulnerability exists in versions before v3.7.4. Until an official fix is confirmed, restrict access to the resolveAssetPath endpoint and monitor for suspicious requests involving asset path resolution.

Description

**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72802](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72802). ### Summary `POST /api/asset/resolveAssetPath` returns the resolved **absolute** filesystem path of an asset, unmodified. The route is `CheckAuth`-only, so it is reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. An anonymous reader who knows any asset's relative path trivially harvested from an `<img src="assets/…">` in any published document receives the server's absolute workspace path, disclosing the operating-system username and the installation layout. ### Details ```go // kernel/api/asset.go: resolveAssetPath p, err := model.GetAssetAbsPathInBox(path, "") // boxID="" → absolute workspace path ... ret.Data = p // returned raw, no stripping ``` `GetAssetAbsPathInBox(path, "")` resolves under `util.DataDir` / `util.WorkspaceDir`, producing a full host path such as `C:\Users\<username>\SiYuan\data\assets\foo.png` or `/home/<user>/…`. The handler returns it directly with no redaction and no publish-scope check. **This is data the project already treats as sensitive.** `getConf` explicitly zeroes `System.WorkspaceDir`, `AppDir`, `ConfDir`, `DataDir`, and `HomeDir` when `util.IsBrowserRequest(c)`, a change made specifically to avoid leaking the username (issue #17410). `resolveAssetPath` performs no equivalent stripping, so it re-exposes precisely the values `getConf` was patched to hide. **Related unfiltered siblings** in the same file, also `CheckAuth`-only with no publish scoping: - `getMissingAssets`: workspace-wide list of missing asset references - `getUnusedAssets`: every unused asset filename in the assets directory Both return asset inventory spanning all documents, including publish-forbidden ones. Verified at `origin/master`: `resolveAssetPath` returns the absolute path with no redaction, `getConf` contains the `IsBrowserRequest` stripping; all three routes are registered `CheckAuth` without `CheckAdminRole`. ### Proof of Concept Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`, otherwise any publish reader account. **1. Harvest an asset path**: open any published document and read a relative asset path from its markup, e.g. `assets/foo-20260101120000-abcdefg.png`. **2. Resolve it as an anonymous reader:** ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/asset/resolveAssetPath {"path":"assets/foo-20260101120000-abcdefg.png"} ``` **3. Result:** the response returns the absolute host path, e.g. `C:\Users\<username>\SiYuan\data\assets\foo-...png` disclosing the OS username and the full workspace/installation layout. **Control:** `getConf` from the same anonymous session returns `WorkspaceDir`/`DataDir`/`HomeDir` blanked, confirming the project intends these values to be withheld from browser requests. **Related:** ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/asset/getUnusedAssets {} POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/asset/getMissingAssets {} ``` Return workspace-wide asset inventory with no publish scoping. ### Impact An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` obtains the server's absolute workspace path, which typically embeds the OS username, plus the installation directory layout. This is useful for targeting subsequent attacks (path construction, user enumeration, social engineering) and directly contradicts the redaction the project applies in `getConf`. The related endpoints additionally disclose workspace-wide asset inventory, including assets referenced only by publish-forbidden documents. Confidentiality-only. ### Suggested fix Apply the same redaction `getConf` uses: for browser/reader requests, return the asset path relative to the workspace root rather than the absolute host path (or omit it entirely). Add publish-access scoping to `getUnusedAssets` and `getMissingAssets` so their results are limited to documents the caller may see.

Impact

The vulnerability allows attackers to disclose sensitive server information, including absolute filesystem paths and operating system usernames. This information disclosure can aid attackers in further reconnaissance and potentially facilitate more targeted attacks. However, the vulnerability does not directly allow privilege escalation, code execution, or data modification.

Summary

CVE-2026-72802 is an information disclosure vulnerability in SiYuan note-taking software versions prior to v3.7.4. The resolveAssetPath endpoint improperly returns absolute filesystem paths to requests that only pass a CheckAuth validation, which is insufficient to prevent unauthorized access. Attackers can leverage relative asset paths harvested from published documents to query this endpoint and obtain sensitive information such as the server's absolute workspace path, revealing details like the operating system username and installation directory structure.

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Affected software

Description

AI analysisMachine-generated, updated 12 Aug 2026, 19:43 UTC

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