VulnerabilityPublished 12 Aug 2026Updated 14 Aug 2026

CVE-2026-72808: siyuan · Missing Authorization

Affects siyuanSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium : upgrade to 3.7.4 when convenient.

Data as of 10 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score

6.9Medium

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 29% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 3.7.4

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Attack Requirements: None
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Vulnerable system confidentiality: Low
Vulnerable system integrity: None
Vulnerable system availability: None
Subsequent system confidentiality: Low
Subsequent system integrity: None
Subsequent system availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: None: The successful attack does not depend on the deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system. The attacker can expect to be able to reach the vulnerability and execute the exploit under all or most instances of the vulnerability.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker.
Vulnerable system confidentiality: Low: There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the Vulnerable System.
Vulnerable system integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the Vulnerable System.
Vulnerable system availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system confidentiality: Low: There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the Subsequent System.
Subsequent system integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the Subsequent System or all integrity impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the Subsequent System or all availability impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v4.0 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 12 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 10 Nov 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponized: A Metasploit exploit module or Exploit-DB entry exists (Metasploit scanner modules do not count), or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade siyuan to 3.7.4.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
siyuan-notesiyuan	Affected <3.7.4	Fixed in 3.7.4
GitHubsiyuan-note/siyuan`pkg:github/siyuan-note/siyuan`Other threats	Affected <=3.7.2	Fixed in–

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AI-suggested

Upgrade to SiYuan version 3.7.4 or later, where this vulnerability is fixed. Patch status is not explicitly confirmed in the advisory, but the fix is stated to be in v3.7.4. Until upgrade, restrict access to the affected endpoint by enabling publish authentication or limiting RoleReader privileges.

Description

**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72808](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72808). ### Summary The `/api/asset/getFileAnnotation` endpoint returns the content of `.sya` PDF-annotation files with no publish-access check. It is gated by `CheckAuth` only, so it is reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. Its sibling, the `/assets/*` asset route does enforce publish access, including the publish password. An anonymous reader who knows an asset path can therefore read the private PDF annotations (highlights, notes) attached to assets in publish-forbidden, password-protected, or unpublished documents. ### Details `getFileAnnotation` resolves the annotation file via `GetAssetAbsPathInBox` (no path traversal) and returns the `.sya` content. Unlike the `/assets/*` route, which applies the publish-access filter including password enforcement before serving asset bytes, `getFileAnnotation` applies no publish-access, publish-ignore, or password check. The guarded-sibling asymmetry indicates the boundary is meant to apply to this data and was omitted here. `.sya` files for encrypted-box assets are fail-closed and not exposed. The gap is limited to non-encrypted assets. **Route / auth tier.** `getFileAnnotation` is registered `CheckAuth`-only. `CheckAuth` admits `RoleReader`; the publish proxy forwards port-6808 traffic with a Reader JWT (anonymous when publish auth is disabled). ### Proof of Concept Reproduced on a local instance (publish mode on 6808, Basic Auth off). **Setup (admin, 6806):** 1. `createNotebook{name:"AnnotPoc"}` → box 2. `createDocWithMd{notebook, path:"/annot-victim", markdown:"doc with a pdf"}` → doc 3. `POST /api/asset/upload` (multipart `id=<doc>`, `file[]=@secret.pdf`) → `assets/secret-...pdf` 4. `setFileAnnotation{path:"<asset>.sya", data:"{annotSecret:ANNOT_SECRET_4471,note:private highlight}"}` 5. `setPublishAccess{id:<doc>, visible:false, password:"", disable:true}` → doc forbidden **Exploit (anonymous reader, 6808, no token):** ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/asset/getFileAnnotation {"path":"assets/secret-...pdf.sya"} ``` Returns: ``` {"code":0,"data":{"data":"{\"annotSecret\":\"ANNOT_SECRET_4471\",\"note\":\"private highlight\"}"}} ``` The annotation content of a publish-forbidden document is returned to an anonymous reader with no publish-access check, while the `/assets/*` route serving the same asset class enforces publish access and password. ### Impact An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` can read the private PDF annotations (highlights and notes) of assets belonging to publish-forbidden, password-protected, or unpublished documents, given the asset path. This defeats the publish-access/password boundary for annotation data. Scope is limited to annotated PDFs in non-encrypted notebooks; encrypted-box annotations are not exposed. Confidentiality-only. ### Suggested fix Apply the same publish-access check the `/assets/*` route uses to `getFileAnnotation` resolve the asset's owning document and enforce the publish-access/publish-ignore / password check before returning `.sya` content.

Impact

Unauthorized users can access private PDF annotation data from non-encrypted notebooks, potentially exposing sensitive highlights and notes from documents that should be restricted. This exposure does not extend to encrypted notebooks or other document content beyond annotations.

Summary

SiYuan versions <=3.7.2 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in the /api/asset/getFileAnnotation endpoint. Unlike the /assets/* route, this endpoint does not enforce publish-access or password protection, relying only on CheckAuth. Consequently, an anonymous user (if publish authentication is disabled) or any user with publish RoleReader privileges who knows an asset path can access private PDF annotations (such as highlights and notes) of documents that are publish-forbidden, password-protected, or unpublished. Encrypted notebooks are not affected. The vulnerability was fixed in version 3.7.4.

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Exploitation evidence

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Affected software

Description

AI analysisMachine-generated, updated 12 Aug 2026, 19:42 UTC

Technical details

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