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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-72854: msgpack-c · Integer Overflow or Wraparound

Affects msgpack-cSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium.

Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.3Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 4% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 20 Aug 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
msgpackmsgpack-cAffected
  • <=7.0.1
Fixed in–
GitHubmsgpack-cpkg:github/msgpack-cOther threatsAffected
  • <=7.0.1
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Until a fix is available, avoid passing untrusted or attacker-controlled length values to the msgpack_unpacker_reserve_buffer API. Use msgpack-c's decode entry points as intended, which do not derive reservation sizes from untrusted input.

Description

msgpack_unpacker_expand_buffer in src/unpack.c, reached through the public msgpack_unpacker_reserve_buffer API, computes its new buffer size using an unchecked size_t addition of the requested size and the amount already used. The doubling loop guards its own multiplication against overflow, but the addition in the loop condition is unguarded, so a request near SIZE_MAX wraps: the loop condition is already satisfied, the allocation is performed at the small pre-wrap size, and the function returns true. The caller is told the requested capacity was reserved when it was not, so a subsequent write of the requested length overflows the heap buffer. The library's own example/lib_buffer_unpack.c demonstrates the reserve-then-write pattern, and its defensive assert comparing capacity against the request is compiled out under NDEBUG. msgpack-c's own decode entry points do not derive the reservation size from untrusted input, so reaching this requires an integration that passes an attacker-influenced length to the reservation API, such as a length-prefixed streaming transport.

References

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