CVE-2026-72854: msgpack-c · Integer Overflow or Wraparound
Affects msgpack-cSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium.
Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 4% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:LExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 20 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| msgpackmsgpack-c | Affected
| Fixed in– |
GitHubmsgpack-cpkg:github/msgpack-cOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, avoid passing untrusted or attacker-controlled length values to the msgpack_unpacker_reserve_buffer API. Use msgpack-c's decode entry points as intended, which do not derive reservation sizes from untrusted input.
Description
msgpack_unpacker_expand_buffer in src/unpack.c, reached through the public msgpack_unpacker_reserve_buffer API, computes its new buffer size using an unchecked size_t addition of the requested size and the amount already used. The doubling loop guards its own multiplication against overflow, but the addition in the loop condition is unguarded, so a request near SIZE_MAX wraps: the loop condition is already satisfied, the allocation is performed at the small pre-wrap size, and the function returns true. The caller is told the requested capacity was reserved when it was not, so a subsequent write of the requested length overflows the heap buffer. The library's own example/lib_buffer_unpack.c demonstrates the reserve-then-write pattern, and its defensive assert comparing capacity against the request is compiled out under NDEBUG. msgpack-c's own decode entry points do not derive the reservation size from untrusted input, so reaching this requires an integration that passes an attacker-influenced length to the reservation API, such as a length-prefixed streaming transport.
References
- github.com/msgpack/msgpack-c/issues/1181 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/msgpack/msgpack-c/blob/c-7.0.1/src/unpack.c (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/msgpack/msgpack-c/blob/c-7.0.1/include/msgpack/unpack.h (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/msgpack/msgpack-c/blob/c-7.0.1/example/lib_buffer_unpack.c (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/msgpack/msgpack-c (opens in a new tab)
- vulncheck.com/advisories/msgpack-c-integer-overflow-in-msgpack-unpacker-expand-buffer-causes-a-false-success-undersized-reservation (opens in a new tab)