CVE-2026-72889: CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Net::OAuth for Perl versions before 0.33 allow the sender of a message to dictate the signature verification algorithm, enabling signature forgery. This occurs because the verify function uses the signature_method parameter from the incoming message to select the verification algorithm without enforcing a pinned method. In cases where the provider uses RSA-SHA1 but the client specifies HMAC-SHA1, the signature is checked against a placeholder key, which can be guessed, allowing an attacker to forge requests for any consumer key and token.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The vulnerability in Net::OAuth versions prior to 0.33 arises from improper verification of cryptographic signatures (CWE-347). The verify function resolves the signature method class based on the signature_method parameter of the incoming message, which is controlled by the sender. This design flaw allows an attacker to specify a weaker signature method (e.g., HMAC-SHA1) even when the provider expects RSA-SHA1. Because RSA-SHA1 verification uses only the consumer public key and does not rely on consumer_secret, the placeholder key used for HMAC methods can be guessed. Consequently, an attacker can forge valid signatures for any consumer key and token, bypassing authentication.
Potential Impact
An attacker can forge OAuth requests by exploiting the ability to choose the signature verification algorithm, bypassing the intended cryptographic protections. This undermines the authentication mechanism, potentially allowing unauthorized access or actions under any consumer key and token.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation has been confirmed yet. Users should check the vendor advisory for updates. Until a fix is available, avoid using vulnerable versions of Net::OAuth (versions before 0.33) in security-critical environments or implement additional verification to enforce the expected signature method.
CVE-2026-72889: CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Description
Net::OAuth for Perl versions before 0.33 allow the sender of a message to dictate the signature verification algorithm, enabling signature forgery. This occurs because the verify function uses the signature_method parameter from the incoming message to select the verification algorithm without enforcing a pinned method. In cases where the provider uses RSA-SHA1 but the client specifies HMAC-SHA1, the signature is checked against a placeholder key, which can be guessed, allowing an attacker to forge requests for any consumer key and token.
Affected software
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AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The vulnerability in Net::OAuth versions prior to 0.33 arises from improper verification of cryptographic signatures (CWE-347). The verify function resolves the signature method class based on the signature_method parameter of the incoming message, which is controlled by the sender. This design flaw allows an attacker to specify a weaker signature method (e.g., HMAC-SHA1) even when the provider expects RSA-SHA1. Because RSA-SHA1 verification uses only the consumer public key and does not rely on consumer_secret, the placeholder key used for HMAC methods can be guessed. Consequently, an attacker can forge valid signatures for any consumer key and token, bypassing authentication.
Potential Impact
An attacker can forge OAuth requests by exploiting the ability to choose the signature verification algorithm, bypassing the intended cryptographic protections. This undermines the authentication mechanism, potentially allowing unauthorized access or actions under any consumer key and token.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation has been confirmed yet. Users should check the vendor advisory for updates. Until a fix is available, avoid using vulnerable versions of Net::OAuth (versions before 0.33) in security-critical environments or implement additional verification to enforce the expected signature method.
Technical Details
- Data Version
- 5.2
- Assigner Short Name
- CPANSec
- Date Reserved
- 2026-08-10T15:44:58.172Z
- Cvss Version
- null
- State
- PUBLISHED
- Remediation Level
- null
Threat ID: 6a855c9ec6e8be03325b476b
Added to database: 08/19/2026, 07:34:54 UTC
Last enriched: 08/19/2026, 07:54:58 UTC
Last updated: 08/19/2026, 07:54:58 UTC
Views: 3
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