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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-74798: siyuan · Path Traversal

Affects siyuanSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.3 Critical : upgrade to 3.7.4 as a priority.

Data as of 15 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
9.3Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 43% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 3.7.4
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 17 Aug 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 15 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade siyuan to 3.7.4.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
siyuan-notesiyuanAffected
  • <3.7.4
Fixed in
  • 3.7.4

AI-suggested

Since the HTTP API handler was hardened but the MCP caller remains vulnerable, avoid using the MCP interface until an official fix is released.

Description

SiYuan kernel before v3.7.4 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the database_clean MCP tool. The tool performs only an empty-string check on the id parameter before passing it to RemoveUnusedAttributeView (kernel/model/attribute_view.go), which builds a filesystem path via filepath.Join without validating that id matches SiYuan's node-ID format. An authenticated MCP client can supply path traversal sequences in id to cause the kernel to copy an arbitrary file readable by the process into SiYuan's history directory (arbitrary file read) and then delete the original file (arbitrary file deletion). The corresponding HTTP API handler was hardened in GHSA-7hm9-v7vf-7g4w, but this MCP caller was not.

References

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