## Summary The core Flex group blueprint `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` (access field, lines 48-55) omits the `security@: admin.super` field guard that its sibling account blueprint carries (`account.yaml:131/138/150`, added by the CVE-2026-42613 fix). A delegated non-super operator holding `admin.users.update` can therefore save a group whose `access` map contains `admin.super: true`, which `UserGroupObject::authorize` then grants to every member of that group, a full privilege escalation to super-admin (scheduler/cron RCE, Twig eval). This is a distinct file, sink, and fix from all four related advisories. ## Root Cause The CVE-2026-42613 fix protected the account `access`/`groups` fields with a blueprint-level `security@: admin.super` gate, which `Blueprint::dynamicSecurity()` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php:644-662`) uses to mark a field `validate.ignore=true` for non-super users so `BlueprintSchema::filterArray()` (`BlueprintSchema.php:263-311`) drops it. The functionally-identical group `access` field, a permission map granted to every member of the group, is declared in `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml:48-55` with `check_authorize: false` and NO `security@` guard. `check_authorize` has ZERO PHP enforcement (`grep -rn check_authorize` across the repo returns 0 PHP consumers; only two YAML blueprints reference it), so `security@` is the sole real control. Because the group access field lacks `security@`, `dynamicSecurity` never flags it, `filterArray` retains it, and `Validation::filterArray` (`type: array, value_type: bool`) passes the nested `admin.super:true` leaf through. The core save path (`FlexObject::update()` then `Framework/Flex/FlexObject.php:683` `$blueprint->filter($data,true,true)` then `save()`) persists it to `user://config/groups.yaml`. ## Impact A delegated `admin.users` operator (strictly below `admin.super`) escalates to super-admin, gaining the admin panel, the scheduler (cron to RCE) and Twig evaluation. Full read/write/DoS (C:H/I:H/A:H). Even absent self-escalation, arbitrary rewrite of ANY group's ACL is itself a full escalation primitive. ## Proof of Concept As a non-super `admin.users` operator who is a member of group `ops`: ``` POST /admin/accounts/groups/ops (or groups.json task:save) data[access][admin][super]=1 ``` `user/config/groups.yaml` gains `ops: { access: { admin: { super: true } } }`, so the operator is super-admin on the next request. ## Attack Chain 1. Entry: authenticated delegated admin (`admin.users.update`, no `admin.super`) POSTs the group-edit form for a group they belong to (or a new group), body `access[admin][super]=true`. Guard: `FlexAuthorizeTrait::isAuthorizedAction` to `admin.users.update`. Bypass proof: `user-groups.yaml` exposes groups at `admin.users:crudl`; operator legitimately holds update. 2. Check (field guard): `Blueprint::dynamicSecurity` marks `validate.ignore` only for `security@` fields. Guard: none on group access (no `security@`). Bypass proof: `group.yaml:48-55` has no `security@`; `git log -S 'security@' -- system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` is empty. 3. Filter: `BlueprintSchema::filterArray` retains the non-ignored field; `Validation::filterArray` (`value_type: bool`) passes `admin.super:true` through. Bypass proof: field not flagged ignore/disabled; nested bool leaf preserved. 4. Sink (persist): `FlexObject::update` then `filter` then `save` writes to `user://config/groups.yaml`. Guard: none. Bypass proof: value already survived steps 2/3; storage performs no ACL filtering. 5. Impact: any member request triggers `UserGroupObject::authorize('admin.super')` (`.../UserGroups/UserGroupObject.php:75`) returning true, so the member is super-admin, enabling scheduler/Twig RCE. ## Bypass Evidence - `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml:48-55`: access block with `check_authorize: false`, no `security@` (confirmed live on tag 2.0.12). - `git log -S 'security@' -- system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` is empty (guard never existed; a permanent gap, not a regression). - `git log 2.0.12..HEAD -- system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` is empty (no post-release fix). - `grep -rn check_authorize` (whole repo) returns 0 PHP hits (guard unenforced in PHP). - `grep -rn "typePermissions|filterPermissions" system/src/Grav/Common/Data` returns 0 (permissions map falls through to array-bool filtering that keeps nested keys). - Guard asymmetry: `account.yaml:131/138/150` carry `security@: admin.super`; `group.yaml` carries none. GHSA-h33v-82r9-v8pm's own text confirms the blueprint `security@` gate is the sole Flex-backend strip for these keys. ## Affected Versions `<= 2.0.12` (latest release; the guard never existed on `group.yaml`, so all 2.x are affected). The missing guard and the strip logic are both in core `getgrav/grav`; the group-edit UI is provided by the flex-objects/admin plugin, but the fix belongs in core. ## Suggested Fix Add `security@: admin.super` to the `access` field in `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` (mirroring

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